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Public health advocates in California have campaigned for new laws for the 
last fifteen years requiring the use of condoms in the production of pornography 
to reduce the spread of HIV and other sexually transmitted infections. This article 
examines the efficacy and constitutionality of mandatory condom laws and cri-
tiques Vivid Entertainment, LLC v. Fielding1, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision striking down parts of Los Angeles’ regulatory scheme but upholding the 
mandatory condom requirement. After exploring jurisprudence related to por-
nography production—including the conduct/expression dichotomy in First 
Amendment law, the strict and intermediate scrutiny standards of First Amend-
ment analysis, the contorted secondary effects doctrine, the perplexing nature of 
the pornography/prostitution distinction by the California Supreme Court deci-
sion People v. Freeman2, and the expressive elements unique to the subgenre of 
“bareback” pornography—the Article argues for the reassessment of the “por-
nography exception” to strict scrutiny analysis for content-based regulations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On election day in November 2016, voters in the most populous state in the 
union cast California’s fifty-five electoral college votes to Hillary Clinton over 
Donald Trump by nearly a two-to-one margin.3 In addition to other state, coun-
ty, and local races, voters also made choices on fifteen statewide ballot 
measures, the most newsworthy of which legalized the recreational use of mari-
juana.4 Also on the ballot was a question that struck many as peculiar. Proposi-
tion 60, titled the “Condoms in Pornographic Films Initiative,” asked whether 
the state should require the use of condoms and other protective measures dur-
ing the filming of pornographic films and require that film producers pay for 
health requirements.5 California voters rejected Proposition 60 by a vote of 
53.7 percent to 46.3 percent.6 That voters rejected the statewide law came as a 
surprise to many people, as the measure was seen as the finale of a fifteen-year 
campaign to codify condoms-in-porn regulations that had been implemented 
through a patchwork of state, county, and city regulations and policies.7 
                                                        
3  CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE ALEX PADILLA, STATEMENT OF VOTE, NOVEMBER 8, 2016 GENERAL 
ELECTION 6 (2016), http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2016-general/sov/2016-complete-sov. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/R65M-M3S8] (showing statewide results as Hillary Clinton with 61.7 
percent, compared to Donald Trump’s 31.6 percent). 
4  Patrick McGreevy, Voters Legalize Pot in California. Here’s What Will Happen Next, 
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-proposition-64-califor 
nia-legalizes-marijuana-snap-20161108-story.html [https://perma.cc/D2AJ-SZJ7]. 
5  Bill Chappell, Condom Mandate for Porn Industry Falls Short in California, NPR (Nov. 9, 
2016, 10:05 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/11/09/501405749/condom 
-mandate-for-porn-industry-falls-short-in-california [https://perma.cc/5Q9S-CQ92]. 
6  PADILLA, supra note 3, at 12. 
7  David Ng, L.A. County Saw a 95 % Drop in Porn Film Permits. With the Condom Law 
Defeated, the Industry Looks to Make its Return, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016, 3:00 AM), http: 
//www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-porn-condom-la-20161111-story.html [https 
://perma.cc/HA7Q-RZMY]. 
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As a result of social, technological, and legal changes, commercially pro-
duced pornographic films began to explode in the United States as a form of 
mass communication in the 1970s.8 From the earliest days of commercial por-
nography production, Los Angeles’ San Fernando Valley has been known as 
the “porn capital” of the world. 9 At its peak—before the Internet radically 
shifted the economics of pornography production, distribution, and consump-
tion—the trade publication Adult Video News placed sales of adult videos and 
DVDs at nearly $1 billion annually, much of it originating from the valley.10 
Some studies estimated that 80 percent of all heterosexual commercial pornog-
raphy was once filmed in the San Fernando Valley, with more than 1,200 per-
formers working for about 200 production companies, typically earning be-
tween $400 and $1,000 per shoot.11 Local economists reported the porn 
                                                        
8  On the sociological aspects of pornography, see generally DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, 
THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY (1989); GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, 
PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988); CHRISTOPHER NOWLEN, JUDGING OBSCENITY: A 
CRITICAL HISTORY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE (2003); RICHARD S. RANDALL, FREEDOM AND 
TABOO: PORNOGRAPHY AND THE POLITICS OF A SELF DIVIDED (1989); LINDA WILLIAMS, 
HARD CORE: POWER, PLEASURE, AND THE “FRENZY OF THE VISIBLE” (1989). For discussion of 
evolving legal doctrines regulating pornography and obscenity in the 1970s, see generally 
WALTER BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPRESSIVE SEX LAWS (1973); RICHARD F. HIXSON, PORNOGRAPHY 
AND THE JUSTICES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE INTRACTABLE OBSCENITY PROBLEM (1996); 
MARC STEIN, SEXUAL INJUSTICE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FROM GRISWOLD TO ROE 
(2010); WHITNEY STRUB, OBSCENITY RULES: ROTH V. UNITED STATES AND THE LONG 
STRUGGLE OVER SEXUAL EXPRESSION (2013); LEIGH ANN WHEELER, HOW SEX BECAME A 
CIVIL LIBERTY (2013). For discussion on film censorship, see generally MOVIE CENSORSHIP 
AND AMERICAN CULTURE (Francis G. Couvares ed., 1996); JEREMY GELTZER, DIRTY WORDS 
& FILTHY PICTURES: FILM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2015); JON LEWIS, HOLLYWOOD V. 
HARD CORE: HOW THE STRUGGLE OVER CENSORSHIP SAVED THE MODERN FILM INDUSTRY 
(2002); LAURA WITTERN-KELLER & RAYMOND J. HABERSKI JR., THE MIRACLE CASE: FILM 
CENSORSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT (2008); LAURA WITTERN-KELLER, FREEDOM OF THE 
SCREEN: LEGAL CHALLENGES TO STATE FILM CENSORSHIP, 1915–1981 (2008). 
9  See, e.g., Susan Abram, Porn Industry Still at Home in San Fernando Valley Despite Con-
dom Laws, Web, Piracy, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 12, 2015, 4:58 PM), http://www.dailynews. 
com/social-affairs/20150112/porn-industry-still-at-home-in-san-fernando-valley-despite-con 
dom-laws-web-piracy/ [https://perma.cc/A6BD-BGZL]. See also Clay Calvert and Robert D. 
Richards, Law & Economics of the Adult Entertainment Industry Today: An Inside View 
from the Industry’s Leading Trade Publisher, 4 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 2 (2008). 
10  Corita R. Grudzen & Peter R. Kerndt, The Adult Film Industry: Time to Regulate?, 4 
PLOS MEDICINE 0993 (June 19, 2007), http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1 
371/journal.pmed.0040126 [https://perma.cc/N69X-Y2E6]; Mark Kernes, Analyzing the 
“Adult Film Industry” Report, ADULT VIDEO NEWS (Nov. 5, 2007, 5:01 PM), https://avn.co 
m/business/articles/video/analyzing-the-adult-film-industry-report-23222.html [https://perma 
.cc/DQP6-54VS]. 
11  Grudzen & Kerndt, supra note 10, at 0993. Christina Jordan, Note, The XXX-Files: 
Cal/OSHA’s Regulatory Response to HIV in the Adult Film Industry, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 421, 423 (2005). 
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industry in the valley generated a total of 10,000 to 20,000 jobs annually at its 
peak.12 
One of the reasons pornography production has flourished in California is 
because of the law. In California, the business of commercial pornography 
grew significantly after the 1988 decision in People v. Freeman, a landmark 
First Amendment case in which the Supreme Court of California ruled that the 
production of pornography could not be prosecuted under traditional prostitu-
tion and pandering laws.13 Prior to the Freeman ruling, most pornographers op-
erated underground, and the state periodically launched raids on companies that 
became too public.14 In rejecting attempts by the state to shut down commercial 
pornography production on these grounds, the California high court ruled that 
the First Amendment protections for pornography possession and distribution 
necessarily covered some aspects of pornography production.15 The basic logic 
behind the Freeman ruling was that if viewing and distributing pornography is 
legal, then there must be some legal rights to producing it. The rationale has al-
so been adopted in other jurisdictions, including by the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court in the 2008 case of New Hampshire v. Theriault.16 The California 
Supreme Court decision interpreting the First Amendment to provide protec-
tions to the production of pornography was a key factor that allowed California 
to become home to some of the world’s biggest pornography businesses.17 
For more than fifteen years, the Los Angeles-based AIDS Healthcare 
Foundation (AHF), led by its controversial CEO Michael Weinstein, has led a 
campaign by public health advocates to prohibit condom-less sex in commer-
cial pornography production as a way of reducing sexually transmitted diseas-
es.18 In 2004, in response to a high profile shutdown of porn filming after actors 
became infected with HIV, AHF sought enforcement actions against condom-
less porn production by state regulators.19 The AHF turned to Los Angeles city 
                                                        
12  Richard Verrier, Porn Production Plummets in Los Angeles, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2014, 
5:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-onlocation-la-po 
rn-industry-20140806-story.html [https://perma.cc/7Y6P-NZUH]. 
13  People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1132 (Cal. 1988). 
14  Chauntelle Anne Tibbals, When Law Moves Quicker Than Culture: Key Jurisprudential 
Regulations Shaping the U.S. Adult Content Production Industry, 15 SCHOLAR 213, 226–27 
(2013). 
15  Freeman, 758 P.2d at 1131–33. 
16  See State v. Theriault, 960 A.2d 687, 688 (N.H. 2008). 
17  See Philip M. Cohen, People v. Freeman—No End Runs on the Obscenity Field or You 
Can’t Catch Me from Behind, 9 LOY. ENT. L.J. 69, 93 (1989) (“The California Supreme 
Court has taken away a new and potentially powerful weapon from those who seek to halt 
the spread of pornographic materials, whether in films, books or photographs.”). 
18  Christopher Glazek, The C.E.O. of H.I.V., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/magazine/the-ceo-of-hiv.html [https://perma.cc/KLF7-EYFR]. 
19  Alastair Gee, Demon or Savior? Aids Activist at War to Make Condoms in Porn the Law, 
GUARDIAN (May 23, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/23/a 
ids-activist-michael-weinstein-condoms-porn-california-law [https://perma.cc/RFM3-XX 
V8]. 
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and county officials for more aggressive action, after growing frustrated over 
several years with what they viewed as weak enforcement by state regulators 
and lack of support by the California State Legislature. In January 2012, the 
Los Angeles City Council passed a city ordinance requiring condoms in por-
nography production.20 Then, in November 2012, voters in Los Angeles Coun-
ty passed Measure B, a ballot initiative pushed by AHF that created a regulato-
ry framework requiring permitting, training, and mandatory condom use for all 
pornography filmed in the county.21 Proposition 60 would have extended those 
city and county frameworks across the state in one unified law, thereby codify-
ing AHF’s longstanding goal of a statewide law with clear compliance and en-
forcement protocols.22 Despite the defeat of Proposition 60, AHF continues to 
fight for mandatory condom laws.23 
Mandatory condom laws ban the filming of a legal activity between con-
senting adults—that of condom-less sexual intercourse.24 As part of their lob-
bying against condoms-in-porn laws, adult film executives said that requiring 
condom use would cripple the industry by unfairly singling out California 
companies, which would send actors underground where testing is not required 
and would violate their First Amendment rights.25 Diane Duke, an official with 
the Free Speech Coalition, argued that adult film actors should have the same 
rights as other performers who willingly participate in entertainment with phys-
ical risk, such as boxers.26 “The goal of [boxing] is to knock someone out—
pound them in the head until you knock someone out . . . . This is the first step 
of government overreach into the way we make movies . . . . It’s clearly the 
                                                        
20  Rong-Gong Lin II, L.A. City Council OKs Law Requiring Condom Use by Porn Perform-
ers, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/18/local/la-me-0118-por 
n-condoms-20120118 [https://perma.cc/GU7Q-FSF4]. 
21  Anna Gorman & Rong-Gong Lin II, Condom Requirement for Porn Filming Approved by 
Voters, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/11/condom-r 
equirement-for-porn-filming-approved-by-voters.html [https://perma.cc/NP2R-34MM]; Sa-
mantha Tata, Citing Public Health Concerns, Measure B Aims to Require Condoms on All 
L.A. County Porn Shoots, NBC SOUTHERN CAL. (Nov. 2, 2012, 6:50 PM), https://www.nbclo 
sangeles.com/news/local/Measure-B-November-Election-Decision-2012-Condoms-in-Porn-
175634651.html [https://perma.cc/Z9XP-YFUU]. 
22  CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, ELECTIONS DIV., OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, 
CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 2016, at 68 (2016). 
23  Matt Baume, California’s Prop 60 Failed, but Condoms in Porn is Hardly a Dead Issue, 
SLATE (Jan. 5. 2017, 1:39 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2017/01/05/california_s 
_prop_60_condoms_in_porn_bill_failed_but_the_fight_continues.html [https://perma.cc/Y5 
ZK-TRGN]. 
24  Ian Lovett, Laws on Condoms Threaten Tie Between Sex Films and Their Home, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 7, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/08/us/condom-rule-may-drive-sex-
films-from-los-angeles.html [https://perma.cc/B5SB-QPTC]. 
25  Id. 
26  Rong-Gong Lin II, Porn Industry May Boogie Out of L.A. Over Condom Law, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 21, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/21/local/la-me-porn-condoms-201202 
21 [https://perma.cc/NG4H-KEYA]. 
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government interfering where it really doesn’t belong.”27 Jason E. Squire, a 
professor of cinematic arts at the University of Southern California, told the 
Los Angeles Times, “It’s certainly a fascinating conundrum . . . . You want all 
performers, whatever they do, to be safe. That transcends content. I don’t know 
what the proper solution is.”28 Legal scholarship on the question has been de-
cidedly mixed.29 
After the passage of Measure B in 2012, commercial pornographers began 
deserting Los Angeles, as permits to adult film companies once issued in the 
hundreds each year dwindled by more 90 percent in the months after the law 
took effect.30 “We’re not shooting in L.A. anymore,” Steven Hirsch, founder 
and co-chairman of Vivid Entertainment, told the Los Angeles Times in 2014.31 
“We’d like to stay here. This is our home, where we’ve produced for the last 
[thirty] years. But if we’re forced to move, we will.”32 Porn with condoms “just 
doesn’t sell,” said Mark Kulkis, president of Kiss Ass Pictures, a Los Angeles 
porn studio.33 “You can’t argue with the economics of the situation.”34 Vivid 
Entertainment reported a drop in sales by 10 to 20 percent when it went “con-
dom-only.”35 Between 2012 and 2016, Los Angeles county records show a 95 
                                                        
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Compare Melody Aguilar & Christine R. Mahackian, Proposition 60: Adult Films. Con-
doms. Health Requirements, 2016 CAL. INITIATIVE REV. 1 (2016); Tara M. Allport, Com-
ment, This is Hardcore: Why the Court Should Have Granted a Writ of Mandamus Compel-
ling Mandatory Condom Use to Decrease Transmission of HIV and STDs in the Adult Film 
Industry, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 655 (2012); Zachary R. Bergman, Note, Testing Solu-
tions for Adult Film Performers, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 183 (2014); Jordan, supra 
note 11; Chris Motyl, Condom Sense: Regulating and Reforming Performer Health & Safety 
in the Adult Film Industry, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 217 (2014), and Kevin Shaffer, 
That’s a Wrap: Exploring Los Angeles County’s Adult Film Condom Requirement, 80 
BROOK. L. REV. 1579 (2015), with Alexander S. Birkhold, Poking Holes in L.A.’s New Con-
dom Requirement: Pornography, Barebacking, and Speech, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1819 
(2013); Stephan Ferris, Sex Panic and Videotape, 28 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 203 (2017); 
Bailey J. Langner, Commentary, Unprotected: Condoms, Bareback Porn, and the First 
Amendment, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 199 (2015); Christopher A. Ramos, Note, 
Wrapped in Ambiguity: Assessing the Expressiveness of Bareback Pornography, 88 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1839 (2013); Marc J. Randazza, The Freedom to Film Pornography, 17 NEV. L.J. 97 
(2016); Elizabeth Sbardellati, Skin Flicks Without the Skin: Why Government Mandated 
Condom Use in Adult Films is a Violation of the First Amendment, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 
138 (2013); and Jason Shachner, Unwrapped: How the Los Angeles County Safer Sex in the 
Adult Film Industry Act’s Condom Mandate Hurts Performers & Violates the First Amend-
ment, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 345 (2014). 
30  Verrier, supra note 12. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
33  Patrick Range McDonald, Rubbers Revolutionary: AIDS Healthcare Foundation’s Mi-
chael Weinstein, L.A. WKLY. (Jan. 28, 2010, 4:30 AM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/rub 
bers-revolutionary-aids-healthcare-foundations-michael-weinstein-2163506 [https://perma.cc 
/5YQW-B5P4]. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
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percent decline in on-location permits for pornography companies.36 In late 
2016, after the defeat of Proposition 60, commercial pornographers began com-
ing back to California. Hirsch stated, “The industry is moving back to L.A.—
unquestionably . . . . The business has changed and has downsized. But you’ll 
see the vast percentage coming back to L.A.”37 A spokesman for FilmL.A., a 
nonprofit group that oversees film permits in the city and county, said, “Voters’ 
rejection of Proposition 60 leaves local policies intact, but may keep California 
in competition for the adult film business generally.”38 
This Article examines the new politics of condom-less sex in the fifteen-
year public health campaign in California, and discusses First Amendment is-
sues raised by mandatory condom regulations in film production, examining 
developments in administrative codes, legislation, and the courts. The research 
also explores whether the government can effectively ban the commercial de-
piction of a legal activity between consenting adults and whether such laws are 
likely to survive First Amendment scrutiny based on legal precedents. Part I 
explores the impetus for regulatory action in more detail, and then assesses the 
alleged harms of non-condom sex in adult film production as well as the per-
ceived social benefits of regulation. Part II explores the theoretical and doctri-
nal frameworks for understanding legal regulations of sexual expression and 
evaluates the First Amendment distinction between conduct and expression that 
belies much of the constitutional jurisprudence in this area. Part III critiques the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Vivid Entertainment, LLC v. Field-
ing39, and discusses how regulations mandating condom use in adult films are 
suspect under the First Amendment. 
I. PUBLIC HEALTH CAMPAIGNS FOR MANDATORY CONDOM LAWS 
A. Government Interests 
The primary government interest articulated in the push for condoms-in-
porn laws has been the protection from HIV and other sexually transmitted in-
fections for actors and performers.40 Over the fifteen years of AHF’s campaign, 
public support for mandatory condom laws was propelled in part by media cov-
erage of HIV infections by adult film performers that public health advocates 
argued was evidence of the failures of voluntary, industry run HIV testing.41 
                                                        
36  Ng, supra note 7. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (C.D. Cal 2013), aff’d, 774 F.3d 
566 (9th Cir. 2014). 
40  For an official summary of arguments in support of and opposition to Proposition 60, see 
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, ELECTIONS DIV., supra note 22, at 70. 
41  Mark Kernes, Adult Industry Leaders Say Condom-Only Laws Won’t Work, ADULT VIDEO 
NEWS (June 15, 2009, 5:47 PM), https://avn.com/business/articles/legal/adult-industry-leader 
s-say-condom-only-laws-won-t-work-345802.html [https://perma.cc/34UM-86ND]. 
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After the adult film industry’s screening process detected a positive HIV test 
for a female actress in June 2009, records released to the Los Angeles Times 
showed that sixteen previously “unpublicized” adult movie performers tested 
positive for HIV between 2004 and 2009.42 While most of those with positive 
tests acquired HIV outside of their work in pornography,43 public health advo-
cates used the 2009 case to question the efficacy of the industry’s self-testing 
operation. They held a public protest outside the Hustler Hollywood retail store 
to “call for the introduction of landmark California legislation that would re-
quire the use of condoms by actors performing in porn videos produced by Cal-
ifornia’s multi-billion dollar adult entertainment industry—a mainstay of the 
San Fernando Valley economy.”44 Three high profile cases of HIV infections 
among adult film performers in 2004, 2009, and 2013 sparked their own cam-
paigns for greater support for mandatory condom laws.45 
Advocates have also used data that shows higher rates of other sexually 
transmitted infections among adult performers as evidence of the public health 
problems associated with unsafe sex. “The average American male has seven 
female sexual partners in a lifetime. But it’s possible for a male to have seven 
sexual partners in a single day on [a] porn movie set . . . . Because this is a net-
work that’s kind of inbred, the spread of disease could be exponential,” said 
AHF President Michael Weinstein.46 
The pornography industry has opposed mandatory condom rules, arguing 
that their own HIV testing policies are superior to mandatory condom rules in 
preventing disease.47 The industry established the Adult Industry Medical 
(AIM) Healthcare Foundation in 1997 to conduct HIV and other STD tests and 
provide results to production companies and actors.48 In 2011, the industry 
transitioned to Adult Production Health & Safety Services (APHSS), created in 
part by the Free Speech Coalition, which is the adult entertainment industry’s 
trade association.49 The self-regulation scheme has required testing and disclo-
                                                        
42  Matt Siegel, Business Before Pleasure?, ADVOC. (Aug. 12, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://ww 
w.advocate.com/health/2009/08/12/business-pleasure [https://perma.cc/HG8U-RBA3]. 
43  Id. 
44  Kernes, supra note 41. 
45  See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 11, at 424–25; Michelle Castillo, Fourth Porn Actor Report-
edly Latest to Contract HIV, CBS NEWS (Sept. 10, 2013, 5:43 PM), https://www.cbsnews.co 
m/news/fourth-porn-actor-reportedly-latest-to-contract-hiv/ [https://perma.cc/9WB9-DPG7]; 
Kernes, supra note 41. 
46  Katie Moisse, HIV-Positive Performer Shuts Down L.A. Porn Industry, ABC NEWS (Aug. 
30, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Wellness/hiv-positive-performer-shuts-la-porn-ind 
ustry/story?id=14412090 [https://perma.cc/KBM7-67SV]. 
47  See, e.g., Alexandre Padilla, Self-Regulation in the Adult Film Industry: Why Are HIV 
Outbreaks the Exception and Not the Norm? 24 (Oct. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1285283 [https://perma.cc/5SV2-G6NH]. 
48  Jordan, supra note 11, at 439–40. 
49  Barbie Davenporte, New Porn Healthcare Service Program, HIV/STD Database Planned 
for Adult Industry, L.A. WKLY. (May 26, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/ 
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sure as a way of protecting actors and minimizing harm, and moratoriums on 
filming have occasionally occurred after an actor has tested positive.50 The 
adult film industry has argued that its self-regulation has resulted in dramatical-
ly lower HIV infection rates among its performers than the general popula-
tion.51 Until 2011, an industry-funded organization called the Adult Industry 
Medial Healthcare Foundation (AIM) conducted mandatory HIV and other 
STD testing every thirty days for performers.52 According to testimony provid-
ed at a Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) public hearing 
in March 2010, a review of AIM’s data shows a lower prevalence of all sexual-
ly transmitted diseases in the Los Angeles adult film industry than the general 
population.53 
Others have suggested that condom-less pornography encourages unsafe 
sex practices by pornography viewers, another reason to police its unsafe prac-
tices. One study of the prevalence of condoms in both heterosexual and homo-
sexual pornography suggested that depictions of condoms in pornography 
could reduce unsafe practices among viewers.54 “It is known that the media af-
fects health attitudes and risk behaviors; thus the consistent presence of con-
doms in heterosexual adult films might increase their use off screen,” research-
ers wrote.55 Other researchers studying the link between unsafe sex practices 
and pornography viewing habits among gay men have found a correlation be-
tween the two. In a study focused on unprotected anal intercourse (UAI) among 
men who have sex with men, researchers found that “viewing pornography de-
picting UAI was significantly associated with engaging in UAI.”56 The study 
did not present of evidence that pornography viewing caused unsafe sex prac-
tices; however the researchers speculated that “the viewing of pornography de-
picting UAI may affect sexual practices and attitudes, or reduce the perceived 
likelihood of adverse consequences associated with engaging in UAI.”57 The 
researchers cautioned against using their findings to support additional pornog-
raphy regulations but said that “the findings of this research suggest that re-
duced viewing of certain types of pornography may facilitate adherence to safer 
sex guidelines for some [men who have sex with men].”58 Another study found 
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that people who watched pornography with condoms used condoms more often 
in sexual encounters.59 AHF said the study “offers a compelling argument for 
condom use in porn films that stretches beyond worker safety, suggesting that 
viewing safe sex practices in porn could yield a broader public health bene-
fit.”60 AHF’s Weinstein said, “People emulate actions, behaviors, clothing, 
hairstyles and other things they see in mainstream movies all the time—why 
wouldn’t it be any different with porn?”61 
B. California Workplace Safety Regulations 
California’s state agency charged with policing workplace safety is the 
California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board of Cal/OSHA. Cal-
ifornia’s Labor Code states that the Standards Board “shall be the only agency 
in the state authorized to adopt occupational safety and health standards.”62 The 
agency has had a rule since 1993 requiring workplaces to use barrier protection 
from blood borne pathogens, which a spokeswoman said, “in the case of the 
adult film industry, means condoms . . . .”63 However, over the years, the mes-
sages from Cal/OSHA have been “confusing and seemingly contradictory.”64 
While state regulatory agencies can institute and enforce rules to monitor em-
ployee safety, they do not have the authority to regulate agreements between 
employers and independent contractors.65 A majority of adult film actors are 
hired as independent contractors, although some have exclusive contracts with 
production companies that treat them as employees for tax purposes.66 
Based on California law, Cal/OSHA’s regulatory authority to mandate 
condom use for all adult production companies remains specious. Some schol-
ars have argued it is tenuous to conclude that all adult film actors are consid-
ered employees under even the most deferential interpretations of labor law 
statutes, tax codes, and common law.67 However, Cal/OSHA has argued that, 
using common law tests, such performers could be classified as employees.68 In 
California, two legal tests, known as the Common Law Test and the Economic 
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Realities Test, present different factors to consider when it is unclear if an em-
ployer-employee relationship exists.69 These common law tests center on “the 
nature of the work being performed, the degree of control the employer has 
over how that work is being done, how the work was directed, and whether the 
principal or the workers supplied the instruments, tools or location where the 
business was being conducted.”70 
Cal/OSHA’s first newsworthy action regulating condoms in commercial 
pornography came in 2004.71 Publicity over the HIV infections of two adult 
film actors shut down thirty San Fernando Valley production companies for 
sixty days,72 and pressured Cal/OSHA to investigate the use of condoms in 
pornography production.73 The HIV infections were traced to one male actor’s 
work on a Brazil porn set, in between testing periods in the United States.74 He 
apparently tested negative immediately after his return, and worked in several 
movies before testing positive for HIV.75 Between the point of infection and the 
positive test result, the actor had infected at least four additional performers.76 
The case sparked several government interventions. The Los Angeles 
County Department of Health requested that Cal/OSHA investigate the safety 
conditions of the adult film industry, and a state assemblyman held a legislative 
hearing into the outbreak.77 
In issuing fines to two production companies involved in the 2004 HIV in-
fections, Cal/OSHA found an employer-employee relationship, but was careful 
to state that the determination was made on a “case-by-case” basis, and that not 
all adult film performers would be considered “employees” under the law.78 
While Cal/OSHA noted that its investigation would be limited to companies 
that employ adult actors, and that independent contractors were unlikely to be 
considered employees entitled to Cal/OSHA protections, it concluded that adult 
film performers could indeed be considered employees under labor laws gov-
erning workplace safety.79 The agency issued fines to two adult film companies 
for violating blood-borne pathogen standards.80 
Another crackdown by Cal/OSHA came in 2010, when Cal/OSHA created 
a committee to study a mandatory condom rule after AHF drew attention to an-
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other case involving a female adult actress contracting HIV in June 2009.81 It 
appears the 2009 case was contained to “Patient Zero,” who did not infect any-
one else in the industry.82 In 2011, based on a complaint by AHF, Cal/OSHA 
fined Hustler Video $14,175 and Forsaken Pictures $12,150 for failing to re-
quire condom use.83 
However, attempts to push Cal/OSHA into more aggressive policing have 
often backfired or failed. As recently as February 2016, Cal/OSHA’s Standards 
Board rejected a twenty-one-page proposal that would have explicitly required 
the use of condoms in pornography production, and other measures to protect 
against blood-borne pathogens, on a three-to-two vote.84 
C. California State Legislature 
Attempts to pass legislation mandating condom use have failed to gain 
traction in the California State Legislature. After the 2004 outbreak that 
prompted the first Cal/OSHA interventions, bills were introduced to require 
HIV and STD testing and prohibiting anyone from working in adult films who 
tested positive.85 Other legislators said they would introduce mandatory con-
dom laws if pornography companies did not voluntarily require them.86 
The state Assembly’s Committee on Labor and Employment issued a re-
port in 2004 titled “Worker Health and Safety in the Adult Film Industry” that 
summarized the core issues, including whether state and local agencies have 
authority to regulate in this area; whether performers are considered employees 
or independent contractors; the viability and legality of mandatory testing and 
reporting; and the viability and legality of mandatory condom use.87 The report 
summarized testimony from various experts with different perspectives, and 
presented a summary of recommendations varying from no government in-
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volvement at all, to mandatory condom laws for all high risk sexual encounters, 
including oral sex.88 
Mandatory condom laws have been introduced regularly in the state legis-
lature but failed to gain traction—most recently in 2014 with Assembly Bill 
1576.89 But largely, the state legislature has left it to state agencies and locali-
ties as it failed to advance any statewide condoms-in-porn bill. 
D. Los Angeles City Council Ordinance 
Public health advocates have had better luck pushing legislation at the local 
level, albeit after much effort. In late 2011, AHF announced they had collected 
enough signatures to pursue a mandatory condom law on a citywide ballot 
measure in Los Angeles.90 City Attorney Carmen Trutanich filed a lawsuit to 
block the ballot measure, saying that state law preempted local authorities from 
regulating condoms in pornography.91 In response, Cal/OSHA’s staff counsel 
issued a letter to the city council indicating he did not think state law preempted 
the proposed action, as it was in the form of a conditional use permit as part of 
the city’s zoning regulation authority.92 In January 2012, likely to head off an 
expensive special election for a ballot measure on the issue, the Los Angeles 
City Council voted nine-to-one to approve a city ordinance requiring actors to 
wear condoms while having sex in film productions.93 The mayor, Antonio Vil-
laraigosa, signaled his support as a public health issue.94 The Los Angeles 
Times said the vote “marks a significant victory for the L.A.-based AIDS 
Healthcare Foundation, which has been rallying for years to protect the health 
of porn actors by asking agencies in California to mandate condom use during 
film shoots.”95 
The ordinance was titled the “City of Los Angeles Safer Sex in the Adult 
Film Industry Act.”96 It stated that the “HIV/AIDS crisis, and the ongoing epi-
demic of sexually transmitted infections as a result of the making of adult films, 
has caused a negative impact on public health and the quality of life of citizens 
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living in Los Angeles.”97 Further, it required that producers of adult films use 
“barrier protection, including condoms, to protect employees during the pro-
duction of adult films.”98 It did not spell out details of demonstrating compli-
ance or enforcement. 
E. Los Angeles County Measure B 
While the city ordinance covered film permits within the city of Los Ange-
les, the county of Los Angeles comprises a much larger area. Los Angeles 
County is the most populous county in the United States, with a population of 
nearly ten million residents and nearly 27 percent of California’s population.99 
Because the county’s Department of Public Health also had more explicit au-
thority and capacity under state law to regulate workplace health conditions, it 
too was a target of AHF’s public health campaigns, ultimately resulting in the 
passage of Measure B, or the “Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act.”100 
Prior to Measure B’s passage, AHF filed a lawsuit in 2011 in Los Angeles 
County Superior Court, AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County 
Department of Public Health, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Los 
Angeles County Department of Public Health to require mandatory condom use 
in adult films and vaccinate actors for Hepatitis B.101 A judge ruled that the 
Department of Public Health had not abused its discretion by failing to require 
condoms be used in pornography production, and dismissed the case.102 The 
decision was upheld on appeal.103 
AHF moved forward on a ballot measure in Los Angeles County, and in 
November 2012, voters approved Measure B.104 As codified in county code, the 
new law required porn producers to pay a fee and obtain a permit from the 
County Department of Public Health; required all principals and management-
level employees, including directors, to complete blood borne pathogen train-
ing; allowed for immediate and potentially permanent permit revocation with-
out prior notice; allowed for warrantless searches of filming premises; required 
an exposure control plan; and required the posting of signs of regulations, 
among other things.105 The ballot measure passed with 56 percent of the 
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vote.106 A number of pornography production companies and adult film actors 
filed suit to block enforcement.107 
F. California State Proposition 60 
Using the momentum from the passage of Measure B, AHF and other sup-
porters mobilized for a statewide ballot measure, collecting signatures and cer-
tifying them in 2015.108 Proposition 60—a measure that, if passed, would have 
resulted in statewide enactment of the Condoms in Pornographic Films Initia-
tive—was on the November 2016 ballot.109 This initiative would have required 
the use of condoms and other protective measures in pornographic film produc-
tion and mandated producers to pay for certain health requirements and pro-
grams.110 The measure’s requirements, in addition to the mandatory condom 
rule, included a licensing system run by Cal/OSHA, and would allow individu-
als to enforce violations through lawsuits against producers, distributers, per-
formers, and agents.111 
In the fall of 2016, state voter guides carried official written arguments by 
both sides.112 Proponents argued that thousands of adult film actors were ex-
posed to serious and life-threatening injuries.113 Further, proponents argued that 
with the estimated lifetime costs of treating people with HIV at a half a million 
dollars per person, the porn industry “has cost California taxpayers an estimat-
ed $10 million in HIV treatment expenses alone.”114 Thus, supporters asserted 
that Proposition 60 was necessary “to hold pornographers accountable for 
worker safety and health.”115 Proponents wrote: 
When pornographers ignore the law, they expose their workers to HIV, syphilis, 
chlamydia, gonorrhea, herpes, hepatitis, and human papillomavirus (HPV). Sci-
entific studies show adult film performers are far more likely to get sexually 
transmitted diseases than the general population. Thousands of cases of diseas-
es—which can spread to the larger community—have been documented within 
the adult film industry in recent years.116 
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Opponents claimed Proposition 60 was poorly drafted, invited rampant 
lawsuits, and would cost millions to implement.117 California State Senator 
Mark Leno made the official argument against Proposition 60 in the statewide 
voter guide, writing, “This is what happens when one special interest group has 
access to millions of dollars to fund a political campaign.”118 He also wrote, 
“The proponent wants you to believe this is about worker safety. But this dis-
guises the real impact of the measure: the creation of an unprecedented 
LAWSUIT BONANZA that will cost taxpayers ‘millions of dollars’ and 
threatens the safety of performers.”119 Opponents said Proposition 60 would 
violate performers’ privacy by requiring them to disclose private information to 
the state, create a state employee whose job would to be “review” adult films, 
and could allow “[m]arried couples who distribute films produced in their own 
homes” to be sued.120 The California Democratic Party and the California Re-
publican Party both opposed Proposition 60.121 
Despite AHF spending more than $5 million in support, compared to about 
$560,000 by opponents, the measure failed to pass, earning just 46 percent of 
voter support.122 The vote was a surprise to many.123 What was expected to be 
the final victory in AHF’s fifteen-year public health campaign actually resulted 
in confusion; all that remained was a patchwork of rules and regulations, rather 
than one law providing statewide uniformity.124 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PORNOGRAPHY: RELEVANT ISSUES 
Scholars identify various normative theories of the First Amendment, in-
cluding the contribution to democratic self-governance, the search for truth, the 
checking value on authorities of power, a safety valve for citizen anger, a tool 
for individual autonomy and self-fulfillment, among others.125 As a theoretical 
matter, it is difficult to argue that pornography advances First Amendment ide-
als related to democratic self-governance or the search for truth, but many 
scholars have rooted its First Amendment grounding in individual autonomy 
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and self-fulfillment theories.126 The regulation of pornography production is 
mired with difficult theoretical and doctrinal questions. In this section, I will 
discuss the frameworks informing constitutional limits to the regulation of por-
nography, including the evolution of the obscenity doctrine; the virtues and 
harms of pornography as articulated through legal arguments; scrutiny analysis 
and content neutrality; conduct/expression distinctions; the secondary effects 
doctrine; and the prostitution/pornography distinction. These frameworks will 
inform analysis of appropriate standards to adjudicate the efficacy and constitu-
tionality of mandatory condom laws in adult film production. 
A. Obscenity Standards 
As a result of litigation beginning in the mid-twentieth century, US law has 
generally settled on a liberal, anti-censorial view of sexual expression.127 This 
laissez faire attitude toward sexual speech has not always been the case, and 
sexual expression has been the subject of regulation for as long as mass com-
munication has existed.128 The First Amendment’s coverage of sexually explicit 
content expanded in part from precedents in cases testing censorship of the 
mails over offensive books, pamphlets, and magazines that flourished in the 
Comstock Era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.129 Until the 
1930s, US courts generally upheld legal sanctions against sexually explicit and 
other offensive publications based on standards from Regina v. Hicklin, an 
1868 case from England.130 The “Hicklin test” allowed for censorship of mate-
rials if “the tendency of the matter . . . is to deprave and corrupt [the morals of] 
those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands 
a publication of this sort may fall.”131 
After new technologies of film and moving images became mass produced, 
they were initially carved out of First Amendment coverage by the Supreme 
Court until the 1952 decision in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson.132 The Supreme 
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Court began to adopt a more critical eye toward censorship of sexual themes in 
the 1950s. Central to the sexual revolution were business ventures, such as the 
commercial pornography industry, that “helped to create a public space . . . 
where it was permissible not only to discuss patterns of sexual behavior but al-
so to portray sexuality honestly and bluntly in fiction, on the stage, and in mov-
ies.”133 In the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court established different lines to 
draw between obscenity and pornography, ruling that the former was not de-
serving of First Amendment protection while the latter deserved full legal pro-
tections.134 As one scholar of pornography noted, “the sexual revolution of the 
sixties and seventies would never have taken place without a series of extended 
legal and political battles over obscenity and pornography.”135 
The modern obscenity doctrine was spawned by the 1957 case of Roth v. 
United States, in which the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Samuel 
Roth for sending erotic materials and nude images through the mail.136 The 
Court defined obscenity as material that “to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a 
whole appeals to the prurient interest.”137 
Over the next fifteen years, the Roth holding was applied erratically in a se-
ries of cases that showed the difficulty in creating objective standards for defin-
ing pornography.138 The Roth holding raised more problems than it solved, in-
cluding disparate ideas about how to define community standards, and whether 
positive values of the underlying work mitigated appeals to the prurient inter-
est.139 In Redrup v. New York, the Supreme Court in 1967 rejected an obscenity 
conviction of the seller of sexually explicit paperback “pulp fiction” books.140 
The judgment was per curiam, although the judges could not agree on a com-
mon approach.141 For the next several years, the Court overturned many ob-
scenity decisions, but with justices split on different reasons.142 Perhaps the 
most absolutist of these decisions was Stanley v. Georgia, in which the Su-
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preme Court in effect said that individuals have a right to possess sexually ex-
plicit material in the privacy of their home, even if the material was deemed 
obscene.143 
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do 
not think they reach into the privacy of one’s own home. If the First Amendment 
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone 
in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.144 
The possession distinction did not follow to cases in which individuals were 
accused of transporting or distributing obscenity.145 
Perhaps recognizing the problems with the “I-know-it-when-I-see-it” ap-
proach, the Supreme Court ended the “reverse-on-Redrup” era with Miller v. 
California.146 In 1973, a Supreme Court with a conservative majority used a 
case involving a California man’s distribution of sexually explicit catalogs in 
the mail to issue a new obscenity test, which remains the starting point for con-
stitutional analysis today. In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court, by a five-
to-four vote, determined that sexually explicit material could be adjudicated 
“obscene” if: 
(a) . . . ‘[an] average person, applying contemporary community standards’ 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) 
. . . the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.147 
While seen as a conservative decision upholding the prosecution of a por-
nographer, the result of the Miller test has generally been a decline in obscenity 
convictions and the flourishing of sexually explicit materials.148 Still, the Miller 
test hardly provides individuals with clarity about what speech is prohibited, 
leaving the application of the subjective Miller standards up to individual ju-
ries.149 As a former executive director of the Free Speech Coalition, an adult 
entertainment advocacy group said: 
Obscenity law is like an unposted speed limit—you’re going down the road, 
you’re passing some people and some people are passing you. There’s no posted 
speed limit. You don’t know what’s okay and what’s not okay, so you make a 
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decision and you decide. But then, as you’re going down the road and you get 
pulled over, the cop says “you’re going too fast,” but it’s not posted anywhere so 
how do you know?150 
After the Miller decision, the Supreme Court’s obsession with obscenity 
cases diminished, and commercial pornography flourished despite occasional 
legal crackdowns that cast a subtle pall over the industry.151 During the presi-
dency of George W. Bush, the federal government ramped up its obscenity 
prosecutions in several high-profile cases of extreme pornography.152 Several 
jury convictions of commercial pornographers were upheld upon appeal, sig-
naling that obscenity prosecutions continued to be a threat to explicit sexual 
speech.153 The Bush administration’s crackdown of Los Angeles-based film 
producers were largely conducted in conservative regions of Florida, Pennsyl-
vania, and Texas.154 The convictions signaled another challenge for the adult 
film industry, as local juries were allowed to use local community standards to 
prosecute pornography that was made available over the Internet.155 In effect, 
the holdings suggest that all pornographers are vulnerable to prosecutions in the 
most conservative regions of the country because of the new distribution model 
presented by the Internet.156 
Even without an obscenity finding, pornography can still be subjected to a 
variety of regulations without violating the First Amendment. The courts have 
given municipalities several mechanisms to shut down adult-oriented business-
es by declaring them “public nuisances,”157 and municipalities can restrict the 
operation of adult-oriented businesses to certain parts of town through zoning 
laws.158 A divided Supreme Court also ruled that nude dancing in strip clubs 
can be prohibited without violating the First Amendment rights of the perform-
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ers,159 and Congress can require public libraries to install filtering software that 
blocks sexually explicit content for users.160 
B. Pornography: Virtues and Harms 
Is pornography a harmless expression of the sexual desires in all humans, 
or a dangerous vice of our darkest desires? The answer to this question has long 
informed debates over the social interests in regulating pornography. It also un-
derscores how answers to such questions have informed attempts to regulate 
pornography and limit censorship. 
A libertarian view of pornography might insist that claimed positive values 
of pornography are irrelevant in determining First Amendment protections if 
the First Amendment right to create, disseminate, and view sexually explicit 
expression is rooted in “autonomy” and “self-fulfillment” theories of the First 
Amendment.161 As such, pornography is expression; and based on autonomy, 
self-fulfillment, and anti-paternalism theories of speech protection, pornogra-
phy is de facto protected by the First Amendment, regardless of its effects or 
uses.162 However, one may advance a positivist argument that non-condom 
pornography fulfills a particular fantasy for consumers, and perhaps allows for 
a sexual release through fantasy akin to the First Amendment’s “safety valve” 
function, and therefore has a value to the metaphorical marketplace of ideas.163 
Using this framework, mandatory condom laws limit the right of citizens to 
produce otherwise lawful, sexual expression and limit an individual’s ability to 
receive otherwise lawful, sexual expression. 
To be sure, the public utility of pornography is hardly universally accepted 
among First Amendment scholars. Provocatively, Frederick Schauer has advo-
cated that some pornography, including “hardcore” pornography, isn’t speech 
at all because it merely serves to spark sexual arousal. Analogizing hardcore 
pornography to a sex aid such as a vibrator, Schauer said that “[d]irect sexual 
excitement can hardly be said to contribute to the marketplace of ideas.”164 
There are several rebuttals to Schauer’s argument.165 One is to attack the 
argument on its merits. Pornography that produces a sexual response does so 
through mediated communication that contains both a message and a process of 
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response that sparks emotion, traditions, instincts, learned behavior, and desire. 
As Jeffrey Weeks has noted, “Sexuality is as much about words, images, ritual 
and fantasy as it is about the body: the way we think about sex fashions the way 
we live it.”166 A second problem with Schauer’s argument is that it fails to ad-
dress a variety of other expression that receives First Amendment protection, 
but can hardly be viewed as being “intellectual.”167 The Supreme Court’s deci-
sions largely, but not entirely, rejected arguments that sexual expression is 
qualitatively different, and more harmful, than other forms of protected speech, 
or that it is not “speech” at all, but rather conduct that serves primarily as a sex 
aid that does not appeal to intellect.168 Protecting the “morality” of society is 
generally not a sufficient reason to prohibit sexual expression.169 
Other attempts to punish or prohibit pornography not deemed to be ob-
scene have generally failed. Perhaps the most notable was the movement to 
deem pornography as a civil rights violation to women. Scholars Catherine 
MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, and Richard Delgado, among others, have advo-
cated for pornography prohibitions not because of its lack of intellectual ideas, 
but because of them.170 In Only Words, MacKinnon asserted “[e]mpirically, all 
pornography is made under conditions of inequality based on sex, overwhelm-
ingly by poor, desperate, homeless, pimped women who were sexually abused 
as children.”171 She identified the harms of both pornography as “including ste-
reotyping, objectification, deprivation of human dignity, targeting for violence, 
and terrorization of target groups.”172 She said that even though women consent 
to participating in the making of pornography, they are not truly able to con-
sent, given the nature of male dominance in society.173 
MacKinnon and Dworkin were activist scholars who turned their advocacy 
into legal proposals, which were adopted by some jurisdictions.174 The City of 
Indianapolis, for example, adopted a version of MacKinnon and Dworkin’s 
model statute that deemed pornography to be a civil rights violation against 
women.175 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals flatly rejected MacKinnon 
and Dworkin’s pornography proposal as a clear violation of numerous First 
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Amendment principles and called such approach “thought control.”176 “The 
Constitution forbids the state to declare one perspective right and silence oppo-
nents,” wrote Judge Easterbrook in American Booksellers Association Inc. v. 
Hudnut.177 Easterbrook also recognized the power of speech to “condition” 
people in certain ways, sometimes in undesirable ways, but to rule otherwise 
would mean “the end of freedom of speech.”178 He wrote that the description of 
sexual dominance is “not real dominance.”179 
MacKinnon’s proposal to regulate pornography swept so broadly as to re-
veal fundamental problems with such approaches. She essentially argued that 
all pornography depicts a world in which women are objectified and subordi-
nated; that this is a serious harm to all women; and therefore, such pornography 
can be justifiably regulated.180 Her argument seemed to provide two deeply 
contradictory propositions: that pornography as such conveys deeply disturbing 
ideas about gender and based on the offensiveness of this idea it should be reg-
ulated; and that pornography conveys no ideas at all and therefore isn’t 
speech.181 This exposes the profound conundrum of pornography and its regu-
lation. On the one hand, as Andrea Dworkin stated, “[i]n pornography, every-
thing means something.”182 And what it means is that women are second-class 
citizens, even objects, to be used at the whim of men’s sexual fancy.183 In this 
respect, the argument is that pornography deserves regulation because of the 
message it conveys; a message that is morally repugnant to a nation that em-
braces gender equality. 
Other reviews of scientific inquiry have not supported MacKinnon’s broad 
attack on pornography. The President’s Commission on Obscenity and Pornog-
raphy in 1970, for example, found “no evidence” that exposure to explicit sex-
ual materials plays a role in the causation of criminal behavior. However, the 
Meese Commission in 1986 said “evidence strongly supports the hypothesis 
that substantial exposure to sexually violent materials . . . bears a causal rela-
tionship to antisocial sets of sexual violence.”184 In summarizing the findings of 
these and a third national study, Gordon Hawkins and Franklin E. Zimring said 
“we have found no more striking example of the drawing of contrary conclu-
sions from the evidence provided by social science research in any area of 
modern policy debate.”185 In another review of academic studies of the effects 
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of violent pornography, Professor Donald Downs suggested that the evidence 
of a causal relationship between pornography and social harms is far from con-
clusive, and even if it were more so, he questioned the strength of the findings 
in First Amendment analysis.186 And Professor Steven G. Gey pointed to the 
fundamental dilemma with MacKinnon’s proposal: In advocating for pornogra-
phy regulation based on a generalized harm to a group of people (i.e., women), 
she fails to address the fact that “no one has been able to demonstrate that iden-
tifiable, physical harms result directly from pornography.”187 
C. First Amendment Scrutiny and Content Neutrality 
When it comes to assessing the First Amendment implications of mandato-
ry condom laws, several basic jurisprudential frameworks are invoked. One of 
the most elementary questions is whether the law is regulating conduct or ex-
pression. The expressive conduct doctrine emanates from decisions of the Su-
preme Court finding that the First Amendment provides some protection to 
conduct intertwined with expression in cases involving compulsory flag sa-
lutes,188 wearing black armbands to protest war,189 displaying a flag,190 nude 
dancing,191 flag burning,192 and cross burning.193 Conduct intertwined with ex-
pression can be protected by the First Amendment under the Court’s expressive 
conduct doctrine, which essentially applies the intermediate scrutiny.194 After 
determining that a law is regulating the expressive elements of conduct, another 
threshold question is whether the law or regulation is content-based or content-
neutral. Does the law or regulation apply to all expression equally, or does it 
single out only some kinds of expression for regulation? Generally, if a law is 
content-based, courts will apply the “strict scrutiny” test, a stringent standard 
that makes it difficult for the law to be upheld.195 Laws that are content-neutral 
are generally constitutional if they meet the standards of intermediate scruti-
ny.196 
A number of Supreme Court decisions have wrestled with what communi-
cative messages were conveyed through different activities. In Spence v. Wash-
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ington,197 the Supreme Court ruled that in evaluating expressive conduct 
claims, the intent of the communicator was relevant, but so too was whether 
there was a “great” likelihood “that the message would be understood by those 
who viewed it.”198 The case involved the arrest of a man who hung an Ameri-
can flag with a peace sign affixed to it from his apartment window, in violation 
of a state statute that prohibited the exhibition of a U.S. flag with superimposed 
symbols on it.199Sometimes, it may be difficult to determine the extent of the 
expressive element present. There are other forms of communication that while 
not immediately conveying obvious messages, still warrant First Amendment 
consideration. All sorts of communications raise difficult questions about First 
Amendment coverage and protection, including instrumental music, nonrepre-
sentational art, and “nonsense.”200 Even when the communication may be un-
clear, scholars have argued that the cognitive reactions to unconventional ex-
pression, such as instrumental music, warrant the communication coverage 
under the First Amendment.201 Instrumental music, for example, provokes cog-
nitive responses among listeners, enhances other communicative messages, ex-
presses specific cultural, religious and social values, and expresses emotion.202 
While not all laws regulating expressive conduct are found to be in violation of 
the First Amendment, those that single out expressive conduct because of the 
expression it conveys are usually deemed to be conduct-based laws subject to 
strict scrutiny.203 
The principle that content-based laws are constitutionally suspect, and are 
therefore subject to the most rigorous form of judicial scrutiny, comes from the 
belief that the “government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose 
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored 
or more controversial views.”204 A foundational case establishing the content 
neutrality principle in speech regulations was the 1972 decision in Police De-
partment of the City of Chicago v. Mosley.205 After the City of Chicago passed 
an ordinance prohibiting protests outside of schools, a citizen who regularly 
peacefully protested against racial discrimination sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief, in part alleging that because the ordinance had an exemption for 
labor protests, the ordinance denied him equal protection of the law in violation 
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.206 The Court said: 
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The central problem with Chicago’s ordinance is that it describes permissible 
picketing in terms of its subject matter. Peaceful picketing on the subject of a 
school’s labor-management dispute is permitted, but all other peaceful picketing 
is prohibited. The operative distinction is the message on a picket sign. But, 
above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to re-
strict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its con-
tent.207 
For a content-based law to survive strict scrutiny, the government must 
demonstrate the law “is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”208 While the Court has noted, it is the “ra-
re case[] in which a speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny,”209 the Court 
does occasionally uphold speech restrictions subject to strict scrutiny. Most re-
cently, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court upheld a law prohib-
iting individuals and organizations from providing material support to groups 
identified as terrorist organizations, after applying the strict scrutiny test.210 
Content-neutral laws and regulations that affect expression are reviewed 
under an “intermediate scrutiny” test.211 Content-neutral laws, including so-
called “time, place, or manner” regulations, are permissible so long as they “are 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,” and are gen-
erally upheld if “they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government 
interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for communication of 
the information.”212 As Justice Kennedy articulated in Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, a case involving New York City regulations on the use of sound ampli-
fication equipment in Central Park, “[t]he principal inquiry in determining con-
tent neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in 
particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech be-
cause of disagreement with the message it conveys.”213 In that case, the Court 
upheld regulations of sound equipment use as having legitimate government 
interests in protecting the quality of life for neighbors and park users unrelated 
to the suppression of the expression of anyone using the sound system.214 
In other cases, in which intertwined expression and conduct are being regu-
lated, the Court has applied a form of intermediate scrutiny when the aim of the 
law is unrelated to the suppression of expression. In U.S. v. O’Brien, the Court 
ruled that a law prohibiting the destruction of a draft card was sufficiently im-
portant to outweigh any incidental speech restrictions.215 The Court asked 
whether the law furthered an important or substantial government interest, un-
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related to the suppression of expression.216 It answered in the affirmative, rul-
ing that the smooth functioning of the draft process was a sufficient reason to 
require everyone to have a draft card and was not intended to stifle protests of 
the war efforts.217 The O’Brien intermediate scrutiny test requires that a regula-
tion impinging on First Amendment values (1) be within the constitutional 
power of the government to enact; (2) further an important or substantial gov-
ernment interest; (3) that interest must be unrelated to the suppression of 
speech; and (4) prohibit no more speech than is essential to further that inter-
est.218 In two cases involving the constitutionality of FCC regulations of cable 
television services, Turner I219 and Turner II220, the Supreme Court articulated 
the thresholds for some elements of intermediate scrutiny, including the stand-
ards for defining substantial government interest, narrow tailoring, and alterna-
tive means of communication. Turner I required that the substantial govern-
ment interest be “real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in 
fact alleviate [those] harms in a direct and material way.”221 And while a law is 
“not invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be 
less burdensome,”222 the law must not “burden substantially more speech than 
is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”223 
The categorical approach regarding the threshold question of whether a law 
is content-based or content-neutral is not as clear cut as it might appear. After 
scholar Dan Kozlowski reviewed divided Court decisions hinging on the con-
tent neutrality question in three controversial areas of First Amendment law,224 
he concluded that “the Court’s malleable definitions and inconsistent applica-
tions leave the content and viewpoint concepts especially ripe for manipula-
tion.”225 
A 2015 Supreme Court decision underscored the malleability of the content 
neutrality distinctions, and some scholars have suggested the precedent may 
have important implications to traditional doctrines, including the pornography 
doctrine. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Supreme Court struck down lower 
courts’ determinations that an outdoor signage law was content-neutral, and in-
stead found it was a content-based law that could not survive strict scrutiny.226 
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The law in question in Gilbert, Arizona, imposed limits on the size and location 
of various outdoor signs, including temporary directional signs to events, ideo-
logical signs, and political signs.227 A church that posted between fifteen to 
twenty temporary signs in public right-of-ways each weekend challenged the 
law after it was twice cited for violating the sign ordinance by leaving the signs 
up too long and not including the date of the events on the signs.228 
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, adopted a bright-line rule to dis-
tinguish between content-based and content-neutral regulations that drew criti-
cism from his colleagues. Reviewing the Gilbert ordinance, Justice Thomas 
said the law was a content-based law on its face.229 A law is content-based, Jus-
tice Thomas wrote, if it “applies to particular speech because of the topic dis-
cussed or the idea or message expressed.”230 Justice Thomas said that “[s]ome 
facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech 
by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regulated 
speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions drawn based on the 
message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.”231 He 
said that because the sign ordinance treats signs differently based on their con-
tent—signs that are designed to influence an election are treated differently 
than signs directing people to a church event—the ordinance is a content-based 
law subject to strict scrutiny.232 “The restrictions in the Sign Code that apply to 
any given sign thus depend entirely on the communicative content of the sign,” 
Justice Thomas wrote.233 “On its face, the Sign Code is a content-based regula-
tion of speech. We thus have no need to consider the government’s justifica-
tions or purposes for enacting the Code to determine whether it is subject to 
strict scrutiny.”234 Additionally, government motives have no place in the anal-
ysis of content-based or content-neutral determinations, Justice Thomas said.235 
“Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a fa-
cially content-based statute, as future government officials may one day wield 
such statutes to suppress disfavored speech,” he wrote.236 Justice Thomas con-
cluded, 
This type of ordinance may seem like a perfectly rational way to regulate signs, 
but a clear and firm rule governing content neutrality is an essential means of 
                                                        
227  Id. at 2224–25. 
228  Id. 
229  Id. at 2227. 
230  Id. 
231  Id. 
232  Id. 
233  Id. 
234  Id. 
235  Id. at 2229. 
236  Id. 
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protecting the freedom of speech, even if laws that might seem ‘entirely reason-
able’ will sometimes be ‘struck down because of their content-based nature.’237 
It would seem that Justice Thomas’s “clear and firm rule” may implicate 
other precedents in which the Court seemingly interpreted regulations more 
generously when it came to distinctions based on content—namely, sexually 
explicit speech. In concurrence, Justices Breyer and Kagan critiqued Justice 
Thomas’s bright line approach.238 Justice Breyer noted that government regula-
tions often involve content in some way, and “content discrimination, while 
helping courts to identify unconstitutional suppression of expression, cannot 
and should not always trigger strict scrutiny.”239 He cited examples including 
regulations of securities, energy conservation labeling practices, prescription 
drugs, doctor-patient confidentiality, income tax statements, commercial air-
plane briefings, and signs at petting zoos.240 “[T]o hold that such content dis-
crimination triggers strict scrutiny is to write a recipe for judicial management 
of ordinary government regulatory activity,” Justice Breyer wrote.241 Justice 
Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer and Ginsburg, concurred in judgment but not 
the rationale.242 Justice Kagan traced the rationale for the strict scrutiny stand-
ard in the Court’s precedents, finding that the two primary reasons for subject-
ing content-based restrictions to strict scrutiny are “to preserve an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail” and “to ensure that 
the government has not regulated speech ‘based on hostility—or favoritism—
towards the underlying message expressed.’ ”243 When the risks of impinging 
on truth seeking and discriminating against viewpoint are small, the courts have 
used a less rigid standard to evaluate the constitutionality of a law—including 
cases involving sign ordinances, and the Court’s secondary effects analysis in 
regulating adult businesses, Justice Kagan said.244 
Whether Reed will be used to reconsider other areas of First Amendment 
law hinging on the distinction between content-based and content-neutral de-
terminations, including pornography regulations justified by the secondary ef-
fects doctrine, discussed below, remains to be seen. 
D. Secondary Effects Analysis 
While it is true that non-obscene pornography maintains constitutional pro-
tections, the protections are nuanced, subject to political considerations, vulner-
                                                        
237  Id. at 2231 (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring)). 
238  Id. at 2236–39 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
239  Id. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
240  Id. at 2235. 
241  Id. at 2234. 
242  Id. at 2236 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
243  Id. at 2237 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 
(2014), and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992)). 
244  Id. at 2238. 
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able to political and social whims, and highly contextualized. One major excep-
tion to general First Amendment protections is the secondary effects doctrine, 
by which the Supreme Court has carved out an exception to its general First 
Amendment framework that allows for greater government regulation than is 
allowed for non-pornographic speech.245 While the Court has generally re-
quired laws that regulate speech because of its content to be analyzed under a 
framework of strict scrutiny, the Court has applied a weaker standard for por-
nography regulations when the laws are aimed at “secondary effects” of the 
content.246 
The Supreme Court created the secondary effects doctrine in the 1976 case 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., in which a five-to-four split court up-
held a Detroit zoning regulation that prohibited adult movie theaters from resi-
dential areas.247 The majority acknowledged that the law was aimed not at the 
content of the adult films but at the “deleterious effect upon the adjacent areas” 
surrounding an adult business, which “tends to attract an undesirable quantity 
and quality of transients, adversely affects property values, causes an increase 
in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and businesses to 
move elsewhere.”248 The majority determined that because the law was not 
aimed at the total suppression of the content of speech but at the secondary ef-
fects of the content, it was therefore more akin to a time, place, manner regula-
tion subject to intermediate scrutiny.249 As scholars have noted, this was a de-
parture from several First Amendment standards, including the distinction 
between content-based and content-neutral laws, and several precedents, in-
cluding Miller v. California250 and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,251 in 
which the Court struck down as unconstitutional an ordinance requiring drive-
in movie theaters to shield films with nudity from public view.252 But the 
                                                        
245  For extensive discussion of the secondary effects doctrine, see Leslie Gielow Jacobs, 
Making Sense of Secondary Effects Analysis After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 57 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 385 (2017). See also Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Stripping Away 
First Amendment Rights: The Legislative Assault on Sexually Oriented Businesses, 7 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 287, 325–26 (2004); John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects 
Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291 (2009); David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary-Effects Doc-
trine: Stripping Away First Amendment Freedoms, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 19, 29 (2012); 
Minch Minchin, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape, 22 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 123, 145 (2017) (suggesting that the Court “minimize[], if not eradi-
cate[]” secondary effects doctrine in light of Reed); Mark Rienzi & Stuart Buck, Neutral No 
More: Secondary Effects Analysis and the Quiet Demise of the Content-Neutrality Test, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1187, 1200−01 (2013). 
246  See, e.g., Fee, supra note 245, at 323–25. 
247  See generally Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
248  Id. at 54 n.6, 55. 
249  See id. at 64–71. 
250  See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
251  See generally Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
252  Jacobs, supra note 245, at 393. 
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Young precedent would be expanded to uphold restrictions on sexually explicit 
expression in various contexts.253 
The secondary effects doctrine, first articulated in Young, was subsequently 
adopted and applied in the 1986 case City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
Inc.254 The case involved a city zoning ordinance in Renton, Washington, that 
prohibited adult theaters from operating within one thousand feet of residential 
homes, churches, parks, or schools.255 The law was upheld by a district court 
but overturned as an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had ruled that based on the O’Brien test, 
the government had not established the existence of a substantial government 
interest nor had it demonstrated the law was unrelated to the suppression of ex-
pression.256 The Supreme Court reversed on a seven-to-two vote.257 The majori-
ty found that the ordinance was indeed a content-neutral, time, place and man-
ner regulation aimed at combating secondary effects.258 
In a decision written by Justice William Rehnquist, the majority analyzed 
three factors related to First Amendment scrutiny.259 First, was the law content-
based or content-neutral?260 The Court acknowledged that the ordinance “does 
not appear to fit neatly into either the ‘content-based’ or the ‘content-neutral’ 
category.”261 Indeed, the Court admitted, the ordinance treated theaters showing 
adult films differently than other theaters.262 However, the intent of the ordi-
nance, as determined by the district court, was “aimed not at the content of the 
films shown at ‘adult motion picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary ef-
fects of such theaters on the surrounding community.”263 Those secondary ef-
fects include the ordinance’s stated purpose “to prevent crime, protect the city’s 
retail trade, maintain property values, and generally ‘protec[t] and preserv[e] 
the quality of [the city’s] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality 
of urban life,’ not to suppress the expression of unpopular views,” the Court 
said.264 The Court dismissed concerns that the ordinance was an end-run around 
content-based restrictions, noting that the law did not aim to close theaters alto-
gether or restrict their numbers, but rather restrict their location for legitimate 
reasons of secondary effects.265 
                                                        
253  Id. at 392–404. 
254  See generally City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
255  Id. at 43. 
256  Id. at 45–46. 
257  Id. at 42. 
258  Id. at 48. 
259  Id. at 42. 
260  Id. at 48. 
261  Id. at 47. 
262  Id. 
263  Id. 
264  Id. at 48 (alteration in original). 
265  Id. at 48. 
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Second, was the law aimed at a substantial government interest?266 The 
Court was highly deferential to the city’s judgment that the “quality of urban 
life is one that must be accorded high respect,” and criticized the appellate 
court’s apparent more stringent burden of proof.267 
The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, 
to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generat-
ed by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasona-
bly believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses,268 
the Court wrote. 
And third, did the law unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communi-
cation?269 The Court said evidence showed the ordinance’s boundaries would 
limit the available area for adult businesses to only about 5 percent of the city, 
in which the respondents claimed there were no viable commercial sites for po-
tential relocation.270 The appellate court used this evidence to determine the law 
did not leave ample means of available communication, but the Supreme Court 
disagreed.271 
[A]lthough we have cautioned against the enactment of zoning regulations that 
have ‘the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech,’ 
we have never suggested that the First Amendment compels the Government to 
ensure that adult theaters, or any other kinds of speech-related businesses for 
that matter, will be able to obtain sites at bargain prices,272 
the majority wrote. “In our view, the First Amendment requires only that Ren-
ton refrain from effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to 
open and operate an adult theater within the city, and the ordinance before us 
easily meets this requirement.”273 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, said the 
law’s focus on the content of the movie theater makes it a content-based law 
and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.274 However, even if intermediate scruti-
ny standards apply, Justice Brennan said the ordinance was still “plainly uncon-
stitutional.”275 He said that the law singles out adult film theaters while not ad-
dressing other businesses that may have similar negative secondary effects. “In 
this case, the city has not justified treating adult movie theaters differently from 
other adult entertainment businesses. The ordinance’s underinclusiveness is co-
                                                        
266  Id. at 50. 
267  Id. (citing Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976)). 
268  Id. at 51–52. 
269  Id. at 54. 
270  Id. 
271  Id. at 54. 
272  Id. (citing Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35, 78). 
273  Id. 
274  Id. at 55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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gent evidence that it was aimed at the content of the films shown in adult movie 
theaters,” Justice Brennan wrote.276 
The Court extended the secondary effects analysis to ordinances regulating 
erotic dancing, upholding, in two separate cases, bans on nude dancing. In 
1991, the Court in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., overturned a Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals decision that found unconstitutional Indiana’s application of 
its public indecency law to prevent totally nude dancing at strip clubs.277 While 
nude dancing is expressive conduct “within the outer perimeters of the First 
Amendment,” a divided court found a plurality that said the law met the four 
standards of the O’Brien test and was therefore constitutional: the law was 
within the state’s constitutional power; it was aimed at protecting social order 
and morality, a legitimate substantial government interest; it was unrelated to 
the suppression of free expression since public nudity in general was the aim, 
not the erotic messages from nude dancing; and was sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored.278 However, in dissent, Justice White, joined by Justices Marshal, 
Blackmun, and Stevens, criticized the application of the O’Brien standards and 
said the plurality did not do enough to apply and justify them.279 “[W]hen the 
State enacts a law which draws a line between expressive conduct which is 
regulated and nonexpressive conduct of the same type which is not regulated, 
O’Brien places the burden on the State to justify the distinctions it has made,” 
Justice White wrote.280 General prohibitions against public nudity are aimed at 
preventing offense in public places, while viewers who pay money to watch 
nude performances inside establishments are not encountering the nudity with-
out knowledge and consent.281 Also, the dissenters stressed the significance of 
full nudity, as compared to performances with required G-Strings and pasties, 
as conveying different messages.282 “[T]he nudity of the dancer is an integral 
part of the emotions and thoughts that a nude dancing performance evokes,” the 
dissenters wrote.283 The dissenters added: 
The sight of a fully clothed, or even partially clothed, dancer generally will have 
a far different impact on a spectator than that of a nude dancer, even if the same 
dance is performed. The nudity is itself an expressive component of the dance, 
not merely incidental “conduct.” We have previously pointed out that “ ‘[n]udity 
alone’ does not place otherwise protected material outside the mantle of the First 
Amendment.”284 
                                                        
276  Id. at 58. 
277  See generally Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
278  Id. at 566–70. 
279  Id. at 589–90 (White, J., dissenting). 
280  Id. at 590. 
281  Id. at 589. 
282  Id. at 591–92. 
283  Id. at 592. 
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In 2000, in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., the Supreme Court overturned a 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision striking down a nude dancing ban based 
on the state court’s determination that it was a content-based law subject to 
strict scrutiny.285 The Supreme Court—while still fragmented, but less so than 
the Barnes court—in a decision written by Justice O’Connor, found the ban on 
nude dancing to be a content-neutral law that survived intermediate scrutiny, 
based on the Barnes precedent.286 Six justices agreed with the judgment over-
turning the Pennsylvania court decision and finding that the nude dancing ban 
did not violate the First Amendment, although Justices Scalia and Thomas de-
clined to recognize any First Amendment issue at all, saying the law simply 
regulates conduct and not expression.287 In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by 
Justice Ginsburg, criticized what he said was conflation of government interests 
between secondary effects and primary effects.288 Justice Stevens said the 
Court was moving its secondary effects analysis too far from its original intent 
and that laws banning nudity within a business are more about the effects on 
the direct audience, and therefore not about secondary effects as originally de-
fined.289 “A secondary effect on the neighborhood that ‘happen[s] to be associ-
ated with’ a form of speech is, of course, critically different from ‘the direct 
impact of speech on its audience,’ ” Justice Stevens wrote.290 He said the law 
resulted in a “total suppression of protected speech” motivated by its antipathy 
toward nude dancing itself and the erotic message it conveyed to the audi-
ence.291 
In 2002, in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books Inc., a five-to-four divid-
ed Supreme Court reiterated the secondary effects analysis as appropriate for 
speech that is sexual or pornographic in nature and where the asserted motiva-
tion is not the suppression of content but the associated secondary effects.292 
The Court overturned the lower courts’ decisions that had ruled against the City 
of Los Angeles’ use of its zoning ordinances to prohibit two adult book stores 
and video arcades from operating in the same building.293 The district court 
found the law to be a content-based law subject to strict scrutiny, while the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that even if the law was content-neutral, 
the city failed to show it served a substantial government interest.294 Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the majority, said the appellate court set too high of a bar 
for the city to prove the effectiveness of its government interest and remanded 
                                                        
285  See generally City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
286  See id. at 301–02. 
287  Id. at 302–04 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
288  Id. at 319–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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290  Id. at 323 n.6 (alteration in original) (quoting Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 320–21 
(1988)). 
291  Id. at 318. 
292  See generally City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
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the case for further proceedings.295 In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices 
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer (in part), discussed the contorted steps courts 
have taken to classify adult business regulations as content-neutral, despite ap-
plying to only sexually themed content.296 Justice Souter wrote, 
While spoken of as content neutral, these regulations are not uniformly distinct 
from the content-based regulations calling for scrutiny that is strict, and zoning 
of businesses based on their sales of expressive adult material receives mid-level 
scrutiny, even though it raises a risk of content-based restriction. It is worth be-
ing clear, then, on how close to a content basis adult business zoning can get, 
and why the application of a middle-tier standard to zoning regulation of adult 
bookstores calls for particular care.297 
Justice Souter was pointing out that the analytical framework that has 
evolved in Supreme Court precedents has created several tensions.298 Those 
tensions include: What is the difference between a content-based or content-
neutral law in the realm of sexual expression regulations?299 How does one as-
sess whether the government’s interest in regulations is truly aimed at the sec-
ondary effects or primary effects?300 What burdens does the government have 
to meet to show that law’s purpose is unrelated to the suppression of expression 
and that ample alternative modes of communication exist?301 
One scholar has argued that while Reed v. Town of Gilbert will likely not 
end the secondary effects framework, it may prompt lower courts to apply more 
rigorous analysis and require a more explicit grounding in constitutional princi-
ples.302 Concluding her review of the history and analytical frameworks of sec-
ondary effects analysis, Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs noted, “[T]he Justices’ 
abstract comments about secondary effects being ‘unrelated to the impact of 
speech on the audience’ do not help regulators to write rules or lower courts to 
decide real cases.”303 
Indeed, it seems that the secondary effects doctrine has subsumed tradi-
tional strict scrutiny analysis for content-based laws in the realm of sexual ex-
pression, and Justice Thomas’ decision in Gilbert may provide impetus for new 
limitations to the secondary effects doctrine. The California Supreme Court’s 
precedent in People v. Freeman, discussed below, provides additional context 
for the conduct/expression dichotomy in the realm of regulating the production 
of sexual expression.304 
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E. People v. Freeman: Prostitution vs. Pornography 
One of the more perplexing problems in the regulation of pornography 
production is the somewhat circular theoretical debate about whether making 
pornography is conduct or speech.305 Some scholars have advocated that por-
nography should be prosecuted as prostitution, based on the rather logical 
premise that prostitution involves the transfer of money for the purposes of sex, 
and pornography usually involves the transfer of money for people to engage in 
sex on film.306 
The California Supreme Court rejected the pornography-as-prostitution ar-
gument in People v. Freeman.307 The Court ruled that the production of por-
nography could not be prosecuted as prostitution or pandering.308 The case in-
volved the 1983 arrest of Harold Freeman, the president of Hollywood Video 
Production Company, for paying actors and actresses to perform in Caught 
from Behind II.309 Freeman “was charged with five counts of pandering based 
on” his payment to five actresses who engaged in “various sexually explicit 
acts, including sexual intercourse, oral copulation and sodomy.”310 A jury con-
victed Freeman on all counts, and he was sentenced to five years’ probation and 
ninety days in jail, and was ordered to pay $10,000 in restitution.311 An appel-
late court upheld the conviction.312 
In a landmark decision for the commercial pornography industry, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court overturned the conviction, ruling that the First Amend-
ment prohibits the prosecution of a film maker on prostitution and pandering 
charges when he pays wages to adult performers engaging in consensual sexual 
acts.313 The court said the prosecution was “a somewhat transparent attempt at 
an ‘end run’ around the First Amendment and the state obscenity laws. Land-
mark decisions of this court and the United States Supreme Court compel us to 
reject such an effort.”314 The court emphasized the legality of the underlying 
                                                        
305  See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, The Legal Line Between Porn and Prostitution, CNN (Aug. 12, 
2005, 2:20 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/08/12/colb.pornography/index.html [https: 
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sexual activities, and the legality of the film itself, based on the US Supreme 
Court’s obscenity doctrine.315 
The California Supreme Court based its decision on two distinct rationales. 
First, the court ruled that the film maker lacked the requisite conduct and mens 
rea to be guilty of the prostitution and pandering statutes.316 The Court said 
there was no evidence that paying actors to engage in sexual activity was “for 
the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification,” as required by prostitution defi-
nitions.317 Second, the Court ruled that even if the prostitution statute was ap-
plicable, it was a violation of the First Amendment as applied, because such 
prosecution would impinge on a filmmaker’s free speech rights.318 In the first 
instance, the court emphasized that the definition of prostitution included a re-
quirement of a “lewd act,” that prior courts had defined to be based on “the 
purpose of sexual arousal [or] gratification.”319 An additional court ruling nar-
rowed the definition of prostitution further: 
[F]or a ‘lewd’ or ‘dissolute’ act to constitute ‘prostitution,’ the genitals, but-
tocks, or female breast, of either the prostitute or the customer must come in 
contact with some part of the body of the other for the purpose of sexual arousal 
or gratification of the customer or of the prostitute.320 
Using these definitions, the court ruled that Freeman’s payment to the actors 
did not constitute prostitution or pandering because the there was no evidence 
that the payment was for the sexual arousal or gratification of him or the ac-
tors.321 “Defendant, the payor, thus did not engage in either the requisite con-
duct nor did he have the requisite mens rea or purpose to establish procurement 
for purposes of prostitution.”322 
However, the court wrote, even if Freeman’s actions could be construed to 
fall under a strict reading of the prostitution statute, they would still be protect-
ed under the First Amendment because “the application of the pandering statute 
to the hiring of actors to perform in the production of a nonobscene motion pic-
ture would impinge unconstitutionally upon First Amendment values.”323 The 
court said that the state’s emphasis on the distinction between “speech” (the 
film) and the “conduct” (the making of the film) was “untenable.”324 Applying 
the US Supreme Court’s expressive conduct test outlined in United States v. 
O’Brien,325 the court ruled that the government interest was not unrelated to 
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suppression of free expression.326 The government had asserted two interests: 
the prevention of profiteering from prostitution, and the prevention of the 
spread of sexually transmitted diseases.327 
The Freeman decision explicitly overturned three prior California court 
rulings and was contrary to other rulings that upheld prosecution of pornog-
raphers under prostitution statutes.328 The US Supreme Court declined to re-
view the decision after Justice Sandra Day O’Connor denied the state’s request 
for a stay, finding that its ruling was founded on an independent and adequate 
basis of state law.329 As a result of the Freeman ruling, the state dropped sever-
al other pending cases against pornographers.330 
In 2008, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Theriault embraced 
the Freeman logic in a case involving the prosecution of a man who offered 
money to a couple in exchange for their permission to allow him to record them 
having sex.331 The New Hampshire high court wrote: 
The [US Supreme] Court has never held that for First Amendment purposes, 
there is a distinction between production and dissemination in regulating por-
nography. Moreover, this distinction is illogical. It would mean that sale, distri-
bution and viewing of a non-obscene movie is constitutionally protected while 
production of the same movie is not.332 
The Court found that the evidence suggested that the intent of the defendant 
was to produce pornography, not for his own sexual gratification, and he was 
therefore protected by the First Amendment and state free speech and press 
protections.333 
The Freeman and Theriault holdings clearly indicate that some aspects of 
activity plainly considered as conduct in some contexts raise First Amendment 
issues when intertwined with the production of pornography.334 The distinction 
is even more important in the consideration of mandatory condom use, in part 
because non-condom sex is perfectly legal conduct in and of itself. 
                                                        
326  Id. at 376. 
327  Freeman, 758 P.2d at 1132. 
328  Id. at 1133 n.6 (“To the extent that People v. Fixler, People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. 
American Art Enters., Inc., and People v. Zeihm hold that the payment of wages to an actor 
or model who performs a sexual act in filming or photographing for publication constitutes 
prostitution regardless of the obscenity of the film or publication so as to support a prosecu-
tion for pandering under section 266i, they are disapproved.”) (internal citations omitted). 
329  See generally California v. Freeman, 488 U.S. 1311 (1989). 
330  See, e.g., Charges Against Sex Film Maker Dropped, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 20, 1988), http://a 
rticles.latimes.com/1988-10-20/local/me-5288_1_hollywood-film-maker [https://perma.cc/T 
7ZQ-TECC]. 
331  State v. Theriault, 960 A.2d 687, 691–93 (N.H. 2008). 
332  Id. at 691. 
333  Id. at 692. 
334  See generally Randazza, supra note 29. 
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III. FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES WITH MANDATORY CONDOM LAWS 
Challenges to mandatory condom laws may be an example of “First 
Amendment expansionism”—the phenomenon of novel legal issues pushing 
the boundaries of the First Amendment into ever more areas of law.335 It should 
be clear by now that mandatory condom laws do in fact raise significant First 
Amendment questions, even though facially they may appear to be laws that 
target conduct and not expression. First, the conduct prohibition proposed for 
adult films raises the same problems that prostitution prosecutions did in the 
Freeman case. While ostensibly only regulating conduct, a mandatory condom 
law necessarily limits the expressive rights of adult film makers under the 
Freeman logic. By prohibiting non-condom sex in the production of adult 
films, the state would be limiting the expression found in adult films. The ex-
pression of non-condom sex is what audiences want, pay more for, and have a 
First Amendment right to view. The underlying conduct is perfectly legal in a 
non-expressive context. Singling out one particular group of content producers 
recording consensual, legal sexual activity—those of the organized, commer-
cial adult film industry based in California—but not by others, also raises First 
Amendment problems. These were some of the arguments presented in Vivid 
Entertainment, LLC v. Fielding, a federal lawsuit brought by Vivid Entertain-
ment, LLC, and Califa Productions, Inc.—two adult film companies—and 
Kayden Kross and Logan Pierce—two adult film performers—challenging the 
constitutionality of Measure B, the Los Angeles County ballot measure passed 
in 2012.336 
A. Vivid v. Fielding 
The lawsuit, filed in the US District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to block Measure B.337 Citing 
Roth v. U.S., the plaintiffs said their work in erotic films, protected by the First 
Amendment, “explore the ‘great and mysterious motive force in human life . . . 
[which] has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind 
through the ages.’ ”338 They argued that proponents of Measure B used mislead-
ing and incorrect information in their political campaign.339 They further ar-
gued that the permitting and licensing scheme, coupled with broad investiga-
tion and enforcement powers and the mandatory condom rule, 
unconstitutionally intruded on the expressive elements of actors and film mak-
ers, and granted the government “broad, vague, and unlimited” enforcement 
                                                        
335  See Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199 
(2015). 
336  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–2, Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 
965 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (No. CV-13-00190 DDP). 
337  Id. 
338  Id. at 1. (alteration in original) (quoting Roth v. U.S. 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957)). 
339  Id. at 2. 
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powers.340 The lawsuit claimed the law also singles out Los Angeles-based per-
formers, claiming that of the estimated 1,500 active adult film performers na-
tionwide, about 300 live full time in Los Angeles.341 Los Angeles adult film 
companies employ an estimated 10,000 individuals in Southern California, the 
lawsuit claimed, estimating a $1 billion contribution to the local economy.342 In 
addition to the First Amendment problems, “by stifling or otherwise adversely 
affecting the exercise of First Amendment rights to engage in sexually expres-
sive speech,” the lawsuit contended that Measure B “puts these expenditures 
and this employment at risk.”343 
The industry’s lawyers made seven core arguments in their lawsuit. First, 
the plaintiffs alleged that Measure B allowed the curtailing of protected free-
dom of expression by a ballot initiative that lacked a legislative record to meas-
ure whether the government’s burden had been met to enact such restrictions, 
citing Supreme Court case law indicating that “voters may no more violate the 
United States Constitution by enacting a ballot issue than the general assembly 
may by enacting legislation.”344 Second, the plaintiffs alleged that Measure B 
was effectively a prior restraint on protected expression by prohibiting the crea-
tion and dissemination of protected expression, absent compliance with permit-
ting and training requirements, and gave the county “unlimited, standardless 
discretion to undertake” suspensions and revocations for violations.345 Third, 
the plaintiffs argued that the fees imposed—initially set at $2,000 to $2,500 per 
year—were established “without analysis, findings or factual basis,” and be-
cause they were required to be paid prior to filming, the fees acted as a “prior 
restraint on protected speech.”346 Fourth, the plaintiffs alleged that Measure B 
was unconstitutionally vague, leaving unknown many elements of the man-
dates.347 Examples cited included language that allowed the county to suspend 
production, initiate criminal proceedings, or impose “any” fine if they find or 
reasonably suspect “any immediate danger to the public health or safety.”348 
Fifth, the plaintiffs argued the law was both over-inclusive and under-inclusive 
regarding the applicability of government interests in First Amendment analy-
sis.349 It is over-inclusive because the industry already takes extensive actions 
to protect performers from being infected with or transmitting sexually trans-
mitted diseases.350 And it is under-inclusive because it targets for harm reduc-
                                                        
340  Id. at 8–9. 
341  Id. at 11. 
342  Id. 
343  Id. 
344  Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 194 (1999). 
345  Complaint, supra note 336, at 13. 
346  Id. at 14. 
347  Id. at 17. 
348  Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted). 
349  Id. at 18. 
350  Id. 
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tion only a small population of adult film performers working for commercial 
companies.351 “Measure B is not tailored as is constitutionally required because 
it is a content-based regulation of protected speech that must be the least re-
strictive means of achieving its stated purposes, and at minimum must not bur-
den substantially more speech than is necessary to achieve that purpose,” the 
plaintiffs argued.352 “Measure B is not the least restrictive means of minimizing 
the spread of sexually transmitted infections resulting from production of adult 
films, and burdens substantially more speech than necessary.”353 Sixth, the 
plaintiffs argued that the law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by limiting their liberty and property interests and subjecting them 
to unreasonable search and seizures.354 Seventh, and finally, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that Measure B was specifically preempted by state law that places juris-
diction for workplace safety rules with Cal/OSHA.355 
1. District Court Decision 
The first decision made by the district court judge was to allow AHF to de-
fend the law.356 The County of Los Angeles would not defend Measure B in 
court and declined to file a response to Vivid’s lawsuit.357 As a result, the AIDS 
Healthcare Foundation and the Campaign Committee Yes on B filed a motion 
to intervene in order to defend the law.358 District Court Judge Dean D. Preger-
son ruled in support of the intervenors, finding they had satisfied the require-
ments under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, establishing 
they had a significant interest in the action; the disposition may impair their 
ability to protect the interest; the application is timely; and the existing parties 
may not adequately represent the interests.359 The judge also cited California 
case law that allowed proponents of Proposition 8, the ballot measure that 
banned gay marriage, to defend the law after state officials declined.360 
On the First Amendment question presented by the case, Judge Pregerson 
framed the issue as follows: “Presently at issue is whether engaging in sexual 
intercourse for the purpose of making a commercial adult film receives First 
Amendment protections. The Court is aware of no case that has analyzed this 
issue.”361 The judge concluded that indeed the First Amendment was implicat-
                                                        
351  Id. 
352  Id. 
353  Id. 
354  Id. at 19–20. 
355  Id. at 20–21. 
356  Order Granting Motion to Intervene, Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 
1113 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (No. CV-13-00190 DDP), 2013 WL 1628704, at *1. 
357  Id. at *5. 
358  Id. at *1. 
359  Id. at *5. 
360  Id. at *2. 
361  Vivid Entm’t, LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1124. 
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ed by Measure B.362 “[T]his Court concludes that sexual intercourse engaged in 
for the purpose of creating commercial adult films is expressive conduct, is 
therefore speech, and therefore any restriction on this expressive conduct re-
quires First Amendment scrutiny.”363 
The district court determined that the law was aimed at the secondary ef-
fects of adult films, and therefore the intermediate scrutiny framework was the 
appropriate standard, not strict scrutiny as the plaintiffs argued.364 “Measure 
B’s stated purpose ‘is to minimize the spread of sexually transmitted infections 
resulting from the production of adult films in Los Angeles,’ ” the district judge 
wrote.365 “Because this purpose focuses on the secondary effects of unprotected 
speech, rather than the message the speech conveys, it will be reviewed under 
intermediate scrutiny.”366 The judge denied the intervenor’s motion to dismiss 
the First Amendment claims. 
In light of the alleged effective, frequent, and universal testing in the adult film 
industry, Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts, which for purposes of this motion 
must be assumed true and construed in the light most favored to Plaintiffs, to 
show that Measure B’s condom requirement does not alleviate the spread of 
STIs in a “direct and material way.”367 
The judge also ruled that Measure B was a classic prior restraint.368 Prior 
restraints, the court said, are defined as “administrative and judicial orders for-
bidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such 
communications are to occur.”369 A prior restraint “bears a heavy presumption 
against its constitutionality,”370 and courts have found laws requiring permits 
for nude dancing establishments to be a prior restraint.371 The interveners ar-
gued that Measure B was not a prior restraint because it did not require a permit 
to show adult films, it only required a permit to film certain kinds of films.372 
However, the district court found the intervenors’ distinction “unhelpful,” not-
ing that because prior restraints chill speech from occurring, they are more 
dangerous than statutes that punish speech after the fact, and that policy con-
cern “would be upended” if the law recognized differences in prior restraints 
for permitting schemes for production but not viewing.373 The district court 
ruled, 
                                                        
362  Id. 
363  Id. at 1125. 
364  Id. 
365  Id. 
366  Id. 
367  Id. at 1126 (citing Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 644–65 (1994)). 
368  Id. at 1128. 
369  Id. at 1127 (quoting Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993)). 
370  Id. (quoting Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
371  See Santa Fe Springs Realty Corp. v. City of Westminster, 906 F. Supp. 1341 (C.D. Cal. 
1995); Dease v. City of Anaheim, 826 F. Supp. 336 (C.D. Cal. 1993). 
372  Vivid Entm’t, LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1127–28. 
373  Id. at 1128. 
19 NEV. L.J. 85, SHEPARD  1/3/2019 4:52 PM 
Fall 2018] RETHINKING THE “PORN EXCEPTION” 127 
 
Measure B, which requires producers to obtain a permit before shooting “any 
 film, video, multimedia or other representation of sexual intercourse” is a prior 
restraint. Plaintiffs argue that Measure B does not provide sufficient procedural 
safeguards, does not have narrowly tailored requirements, and gives the County 
unbridled discretion. The Court generally agrees.374 
As a result of this determination, the district court issued a preliminary in-
junction striking several provisions of Measure B as likely unconstitutional vio-
lations of prior restraint doctrine.375 The judge ruled there were not sufficient 
procedural safeguards to assure prompt judicial review of license suspensions 
and revocations by the county, and allowed “unbridled discretion” over the de-
nial of permits by “unnamed, undescribed ‘standards affecting public 
health.’ ”376 The law also potentially allowed permanent license suspensions, 
and required permits for all adult films defined as follows: 
[A]ny film, video, multimedia or other representation of sexual intercourse in 
which performers actually engage in oral, vaginal, or anal penetration, including, 
but not limited to, penetration by a penis, finger, or inanimate object; oral con-
tact with the anus or genitals of another performer; and/or other sexual activity 
that may result in the transmission of blood and/or any other potentially infec-
tious materials.377 
This much broader definition of an adult film covered by Measure B’s condom 
requirement provides support for plaintiff’s claim that the permitting require-
ment was not narrowly tailored, the district court ruled.378 
The judge determined that there was sufficient evidence for the plaintiffs to 
survive motions to dismiss on other elements, including the fees system and a 
Fourth Amendment claim on the warrantless search provisions.379 For these 
reasons, the judge issued a preliminary injunction.380 On the merits of the other 
claims, the district court dismissed claims that the county impermissibly al-
lowed ballot measures on First Amendment issues without legislative findings, 
and that it was preempted by state law.381 
However, the district court declined to issue a preliminary injunction on the 
First Amendment claim regarding the condom requirement, finding that it 
would be unlikely to succeed on the merits.382 In determining this, the judge 
said that under the intermediate scrutiny framework, the courts would need to 
determine whether the harms that Measure B targets “are real, not merely con-
jectural, and that [Measure B] will in fact alleviate those harms in a direct and 
                                                        
374  Id. 
375  Id. at 1134. 
376  Id. at 1129. 
377  Id. at 1130–31. 
378  Id. at 1131. 
379  Id. at 1136. 
380  Id. at 1134. 
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material way.”383 Citing data provided by Jonathan Fielding, the county’s direc-
tor of public health, the court noted that incidences of STDs among adult film 
actors surpassed that of the general public, and thus appeared to be a workable 
way to reduce STDs among adult film performers, despite the plaintiffs’ argu-
ment that its testing regimen is sufficient.384 
2. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held the district court’s decision.385 In its independent review of the facts, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that Measure B was indeed a content-based law that limits 
expression, and thus warranted First Amendment scrutiny.386 However, the 
Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that strict scrutiny should apply, and in-
stead agreed with the district court that intermediate scrutiny was the appropri-
ate standard.387 The Court’s analysis supported the district court’s decision, rul-
ing the law survived intermediate scrutiny by having only a de minimis effect 
on expression, was narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial government inter-
est, and left open adequate alternative means of expression.388 
First, the Court rejected claims by the plaintiffs that the district court erred 
in severing elements of the ordinance it viewed as unconstitutional while allow-
ing other elements, including the mandatory condom rule, to remain.389 After 
discussing the precedents involving severability, including the tension between 
not wanting federal courts to become judicial legislators but wanting them to 
respect separation of powers principles by not nullifying an entire statute when 
only portions of it are unconstitutional, the Court ruled that the district court 
had not erred in severing four parts of the ordinance.390 Additionally, the appel-
late court noted that Measure B’s severability clause specifically allowed for 
the ordinance to remain in force if specific parts of it were struck down by the 
courts.391 
Next, the appellate court turned to the appropriate standard of review. The 
Court said it assumed without deciding that the law’s condom mandate is a 
content-based regulation.392 While First Amendment precedent generally calls 
for the strict scrutiny standard of review to be applied to content-based laws, 
                                                        
383  Id. at 1135 (alteration in original) (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 644–65 (1994)). 
384  Id. 
385  See generally Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2014). 
386  Id. at 578. 
387  Id. 
388  Id. at 580. 
389  Id. at 577. 
390  Id. at 573, 577. 
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the Court traced a long line of Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedents, in-
volving regulations of sexual expression and pornography, to justify its deci-
sion that intermediate scrutiny was the correct standard.393 The courts have 
carved out a “pornography exception” to the general rule that content-based 
regulations of expression require strict scrutiny, the Court noted.394 When laws 
are aimed at preventing “secondary effects” of pornography and not at the ex-
pression itself, courts have used the more deferential intermediate scrutiny 
standard.395 
In rejecting the strict scrutiny standard, a key analytical issue was whether 
condom-less pornography conveyed ideas that were different from pornography 
requiring condoms. The plaintiffs argued that in fact it did; that “condomless 
sex differs from sex generally because condoms remind the audience about re-
al-world concerns such as pregnancy and disease.”396 The Court rejected this 
argument, writing that viewers were unlikely to make that inference, conclud-
ing that the general idea is the erotic message, not particularized ideas or atti-
tudes expressed from condom-less pornography.397 “So condomless sex is not 
the relevant expression for First Amendment purposes; instead, the relevant ex-
pression is more generally the adult films’ erotic message.”398 
In a footnote, the Court also questioned whether Measure B was in fact a 
ban on expression at all; seemingly undermining its assumption that Measure B 
was a content-based regulation of expression.399 “On its face, Measure B does 
not ban expression; it does not prohibit the depiction of condomless sex, but 
rather limits only the way film is produced.”400 The Court said Measure B was 
similar to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gammoh requiring a two-foot distance 
between dancers and patrons, which did not ban a dance’s particular form or 
content.401 The Court ruled the law “does not ban the relevant expression com-
pletely.”402 The Court wrote: “[t]he requirement that actors in adult films wear 
condoms while engaging in sexual intercourse might have ‘some minimal ef-
fect’ on a film’s erotic message, but that effect is certainly no greater than the 
effect of pasties and G-strings on the erotic message of nude dancing,” the 
Court wrote.403 Because the law only imposes a de minimis restriction on ex-
pression, the Court ruled strict scrutiny was an inappropriate standard.404 
                                                        
393  Id. 
394  Id. 
395  Id. 
396  Id. at 579. 
397  Id. 
398  Id. (footnote omitted). 
399  Id. 
400  Id. at 579 n.6. 
401  Id. at 578. 
402  Id. at 579. 
403  Id. at 580. 
404  Id. at 578. 
19 NEV. L.J. 85, SHEPARD  1/3/2019 4:52 PM 
130 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1  
 
Next, the Court assessed the law’s constitutionality in the context of inter-
mediate scrutiny standards of substantial government interest, narrow tailoring, 
and ample alternative avenues of communication. The appellate court conclud-
ed a substantial government interest by reviewing the stated purpose of Meas-
ure B as being twofold: (1) the decrease of sexually transmitted infections 
among adult film performers; and (2) the decrease of sexually transmitted in-
fections “to the general population among whom the performers dwell.”405 The 
Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the law was not narrowly tai-
lored.406 The Court summarized this prong as follows: “[i]n order to be narrow-
ly tailored for purposes of intermediate scrutiny, the regulation “ ‘need not be 
the least restrictive or the least intrusive means” available to achieve the gov-
ernment’s legitimate interests,’ ” but will survive “so long as the regulation 
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effec-
tively absent the regulation.”407 The plaintiffs argued that its own testing and 
reporting system was effective, although the Courts cited the 2009 letter from 
the county’s health department citing higher rates of STI infection among adult 
film performers as evidence to the contrary.408 The 2009 letter was “especially 
compelling,” the court noted.409 Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that because 
the law would prompt adult film companies to move filming outside of the 
County of Los Angeles, the law was ineffective in stopping the underlying 
conduct of unsafe sex practices.410 The Court suggested that this was unpersua-
sive, citing contradictory evidence that film permits dropped but the “regular” 
film infrastructure in Los Angeles made it difficult for the adult industry to 
move.411 Finally, the appellate court noted that ample alternative means of 
communication are left intact for adult filmmakers to convey erotic messages 
through films; therefore the law meets the requirements of the third prong of 
intermediate scrutiny analysis.412 
B. Implications and Analysis 
Future attempts to pass or expand mandatory condom laws will need to use 
the framework of the Vivid v. Fielding analysis in order to survive First 
Amendment challenges; while plaintiffs will need to use the framework in or-
der to challenge existing laws or attempts to create new ones. Several factors 
stand out for additional analysis and critique. 
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First, mandatory condom laws are sufficiently intertwined with the expres-
sive elements of pornography production to warrant coverage under the First 
Amendment. While perhaps not immediately evident, a review of First 
Amendment theories and doctrines, as well as case law including People v. 
Freeman, provide ample evidence to support the conclusion that the expression 
in pornography is limited by mandatory condom laws. 
To be sure, the basis for First Amendment protection of conduct associated 
with the production of speech is a perplexing problem. Ashutosh Bhagwat has 
argued that First Amendment history and doctrines provides a foundation for 
protections of conduct associated with expression, including the role of licens-
ing rules for printers during the Revolutionary Era, and more recent precedents 
such as Citizens United v. FEC, finding that spending money to amplify speech 
messages is a form of speech itself.413 After reviewing cases involving the 
regulation of conduct that burdens free expression in different ways, including 
taxing ink and paper, recording public officials, tattooing, “ag-gag” laws, pho-
tography, and the right to gather information, Bhagwat concludes “it seems 
clear that the First Amendment protects not only literal acts of communication 
but also penumbral conduct associated with the distribution and production of 
speech.”414 In defending the applicability of the First Amendment to acts of 
speech production, Professor Bhagwat says that history and doctrine support 
protections but also provide deference to government regulations for laws of 
general applicability when the government “can make a strong, plausible case 
that the harm it is combatting is unrelated to the message or communicative 
impact.”415 Professor Bhagwat suggests a need for scrutiny analysis to focus on 
assessing the government’s interest in regulation as being unrelated to the 
communicative impact of the suppressed speech.416 Regarding Measure B and 
mandatory condom laws, he hedges.417 “The question of whether Measure B is 
truly necessary to achieve the government’s regulatory goals is thus open to 
dispute,” he writes.418 Professor Bhagwat concludes: 
Measure B thus poses a genuinely difficult problem. It is supported by strong 
government interests and is well tailored, both weighing in favor of its validity. 
On the other hand, its necessity is subject to dispute and its impact on a particu-
lar category of speech production is significant. On the whole, however, I am in-
clined to think that because of the strength of the government’s interest in con-
trolling STDs, and because the industry retains the option of creating digital 
bareback pornography, Measure B should be upheld.419 
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Second, strict scrutiny should be the appropriate standard for reviewing 
mandatory condom laws under First Amendment analysis. Because mandatory 
condom laws in adult film making do in fact impinge upon expressive elements 
on content creators, we need to determine what level of scrutiny such laws 
would have to survive in constitutional analysis. By singling out non-condom 
intercourse for prohibition, in commercially produced pornography only, the 
law is targeting a particular kind of content, and thus the courts should apply a 
strict scrutiny analysis, which is the most exacting scrutiny for a law to pass. 
While the courts in Vivid v. Fielding used the secondary effects doctrine as an 
end-run around strict scrutiny, they generally acknowledge that the mandatory 
condom laws are content-based laws.420 This distorted reasoning used to apply 
intermediate scrutiny should be abandoned and the courts should apply the ap-
propriate test based on the nature of the regulation—that is, strict scrutiny to a 
content-based law. Recent Supreme Court precedents suggest broader consid-
erations for analyzing when laws are content-based, lending support to argu-
ments that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard for mandatory condom 
laws.421 
Third, the expressive elements of condom-less pornography are varied and 
nuanced, but it is clear that condom-less pornography conveys different mean-
ings from producers to viewers. This was dealt with only cursorily in Vivid v. 
Fielding.422 A segment of homosexual pornography known as “bareback” porn 
defiantly does not use condoms, and one scholar who has studied this move-
ment as a subculture argues that barebacking as pornography is filled with 
unique political overtones and intellectual and aesthetic elements.423 Addition-
ally, some industry leaders have accused public-health advocates of distorting 
their real goal: to decrease the amount of condom-less sex in pornography, 
which would in fact be an effort to suppress speech. “[I]t has much more to do 
with their view that pornography incorrectly models what they would like to 
see as universal sexual social behavior, and that their real concerns here are po-
litical,” Ernest Greene, a former member of the board of directors of the adult 
industry’s self-testing unit, said.424 Some studies of pornography viewing habits 
in gay men have suggested a relationship between interest in condom-less por-
nography and unsafe sex practices.425 Especially as it relates to the genre of gay 
bareback pornography and the pornography and sex practices of gay men, non-
condom pornography can also be viewed as “political” in the sense that its 
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message is targeted based on its social and cultural content.426 The First 
Amendment is sensitive to tolerance for the expression of sexual minorities and 
deviants.427 
Fourth, it is far from unclear that policing sex between consenting adults in 
cases such as this is a compelling government interest. Policing safe sex among 
consenting adults has been a longstanding problem in the regulation of human 
behavior.428 Requiring condom use among consensual adults might not even 
pass the first threshold of the O’Brien429 test, as the government lacks the au-
thority to mandate condom use among consenting adults in the general popula-
tion. The contractual relationships between pornography production companies 
and performers further complicate the government’s authority to regulate the 
behaviors of actors under California employment law. Because performers are 
generally considered to be independent contractors,430 they are freer to negoti-
ate the terms of their work, and if they want to participate in lawful, non-
condom sex for the purposes of a film, they may have a liberty right to freely 
do so because of the legality of the underlying conduct in a non-expressive set-
ting. 
Fifth, it is also unclear that mandatory condom laws are effective means of 
achieving a compelling government interest. While on its face a mandatory 
condom laws would appear to increase the safety of performers in the adult in-
dustry, such a claim becomes questionable after analyzing the extent to which 
the industry already polices itself. Thus, and upon closer scrutiny, such regula-
tions would likely fail the O’Brien431 test’s second prong. The available data 
shows that the industry’s testing process effectively screens performers regular-
ly, with advanced rapid tests, and monitors closely the results.432 Therefore, 
given the successful history of the industry’s self-regulation, a mandatory con-
dom law may not further an important government interest. The analysis is fur-
ther complicated by the third prong of the O’Brien analysis requiring the regu-
lation be unrelated to the suppression of expression.433 Ostensibly, a mandatory 
condom law is aimed at the health of performers and not at suppressing speech. 
But the prostitution/pornography distinction raised in People v. Freeman be-
comes important here, because similarly the suppression of the conduct neces-
sarily suppresses the expression.434 
Finally, this Article reveals that the secondary effects doctrine is a mess, 
both theoretically and as a predictive analytical tool. This supports the findings 
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of other scholars that have criticized the contorted evolution of this doctrine 
well beyond its original intent.435 
CONCLUSION 
Laws requiring condom use in commercial pornography present a complex 
problem in the evolution of First Amendment doctrine. The expansion of First 
Amendment protection to sexual speech is the primary reason why the adult 
film industry has been allowed to exist, and flourish, over the past fifty years. 
Outlawing bareback sexual intercourse in the production of adult movies re-
stricts expressive activity that is both lawful when considered strictly as con-
duct and the depiction of which, separate from the conduct itself, is fully pro-
tected by the First Amendment. The California Supreme Court has held that the 
“conduct” of pornography production cannot be punished without consideration 
of the First Amendment values that are impugned. The US Supreme Court’s 
First Amendment jurisprudence sets a high bar for such efforts to punish. It is a 
bar that mandatory condom laws will not likely meet. 
                                                        
435  See Jacobs, supra note 245. 
